In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_event: move wake reason storage into validated event handlers
hci_store_wake_reason() is called from hci_event_packet() immediately
after stripping the HCI event header but before hci_event_func()
enforces the per-event minimum payload length from hci_ev_table.
This means a short HCI event frame can reach bacpy() before any bounds
check runs.
Rather than duplicating skb parsing and per-event length checks inside
hci_store_wake_reason(), move wake-address storage into the individual
event handlers after their existing event-length validation has
succeeded. Convert hci_store_wake_reason() into a small helper that only
stores an already-validated bdaddr while the caller holds hci_dev_lock().
Use the same helper after hci_event_func() with a NULL address to
preserve the existing unexpected-wake fallback semantics when no
validated event handler records a wake address.
Annotate the helper with __must_hold(&hdev->lock) and add
lockdep_assert_held(&hdev->lock) so future call paths keep the lock
contract explicit.
Call the helper from hci_conn_request_evt(), hci_conn_complete_evt(),
hci_sync_conn_complete_evt(), le_conn_complete_evt(),
hci_le_adv_report_evt(), hci_le_ext_adv_report_evt(),
hci_le_direct_adv_report_evt(), hci_le_pa_sync_established_evt(), and
hci_le_past_received_evt().
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (8.1): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 8.1 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 8.1 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.3% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS. FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it