In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vt: discard stale unicode buffer on alt screen exit after resize
When enter_alt_screen() saves vc_uni_lines into vc_saved_uni_lines and
sets vc_uni_lines to NULL, a subsequent console resize via vc_do_resize()
skips reallocating the unicode buffer because vc_uni_lines is NULL.
However, vc_saved_uni_lines still points to the old buffer allocated for
the original dimensions.
When leave_alt_screen() later restores vc_saved_uni_lines, the buffer
dimensions no longer match vc_rows/vc_cols. Any operation that iterates
over the unicode buffer using the current dimensions (e.g. csi_J clearing
the screen) will access memory out of bounds, causing a kernel oops:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0x0000002000000020
RIP: 0010:csi_J+0x133/0x2d0
The faulting address 0x0000002000000020 is two adjacent u32 space
characters (0x20) interpreted as a pointer, read from the row data area
past the end of the 25-entry pointer array in a buffer allocated for
80x25 but accessed with 240x67 dimensions.
Fix this by checking whether the console dimensions changed while in the
alternate screen. If they did, free the stale saved buffer instead of
restoring it. The unicode screen will be lazily rebuilt via
vc_uniscr_check() when next needed.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (7.8): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 7.8 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 7.8 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.1% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-27). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it