In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Fix use-after-free in mlx5e_tx_reporter_timeout_recover
mlx5e_tx_reporter_timeout_recover() accesses sq->netdev after
mlx5e_safe_reopen_channels() has torn down and freed the channel (and
its embedded SQs). Replace the three sq->netdev references with
priv->netdev which is safe because priv outlives channel teardown.
The netdev_err() call already used priv->netdev for this reason; make
the trylock/unlock and health_channel_eq_recover calls consistent.
This fixes the following KASAN splat:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mlx5e_tx_reporter_timeout_recover+0x1dd/0x360 [mlx5_core]
Read of size 8 at addr ffff889860ed0b28 by task kworker/u113:2/5277
Call Trace:
mlx5e_tx_reporter_timeout_recover+0x1dd/0x360 [mlx5_core]
devlink_health_reporter_recover+0xa2/0x150
devlink_health_report+0x254/0x7c0
mlx5e_reporter_tx_timeout+0x297/0x380 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_tx_timeout_work+0x109/0x170 [mlx5_core]
process_one_work+0x677/0xf20
worker_thread+0x51f/0xd90
kthread+0x3a5/0x810
ret_from_fork+0x208/0x400
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it