In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/v3d: Fix use-after-free of CPU job query arrays on error path
The CPU job ioctl's fail label calls kvfree() on cpu_job's timestamp and
performance query arrays after v3d_job_cleanup(), which drops the job's
last reference and frees cpu_job. Reading cpu_job at that point is a
use-after-free. Also, on the early v3d_job_init() failure path, it is a
NULL dereference, since v3d_job_deallocate() zeroes the local pointer.
In the success path, the arrays are released from the scheduler's
.free_job callback, but on the error path, they are freed manually, as
the job was never pushed to the scheduler. While the success path deals
with this correctly, the fail path doesn't.
On top of that, the manual kvfree() calls only free the array storage;
they don't drm_syncobj_put() the per-query syncobjs that
v3d_timestamp_query_info_free() and v3d_performance_query_info_free()
release on the success path. So the same fail path that triggers the
use-after-free also leaks one syncobj reference per query.
Unify the CPU job teardown into the CPU job's kref destructor, mirroring
v3d_render_job_free(). The scheduler's .free_job slot reverts to the
generic v3d_sched_job_free() and the fail label drops the manual
kvfree() calls, leaving a single teardown path that is reached from both
the scheduler and the ioctl error path. That removes the use-after-free,
the NULL dereference, and the syncobj leak by construction.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it