In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: isci: Fix use-after-free in device removal path
The ISCI completion tasklet is initialized in isci_host_alloc()
(drivers/scsi/isci/init.c:496) and scheduled from both MSI-X and legacy
interrupt handlers (drivers/scsi/isci/host.c:223,613).
isci_host_deinit() stops the controller and waits for stop completion,
but it never kills completion_tasklet before teardown continues. A
top-of-function tasklet_kill() is not sufficient here: interrupts are
only disabled when isci_host_stop_complete() runs, so until
wait_for_stop() returns the IRQ handlers can still requeue the
tasklet. The tasklet callback also re-enables interrupts after draining
completions, so killing the tasklet before the source is quiesced leaves
the same race open.
Once wait_for_stop() returns, no further IRQ-driven scheduling can
occur. Kill completion_tasklet there so teardown cannot race a queued
tasklet running on a dead ihost. On remove or unload, the stale callback
can otherwise dereference ihost and touch ihost->smu_registers after the
host lifetime ends.
A UML + KASAN analogue reproduced the failure class both with no
tasklet_kill() and with tasklet_kill() placed before source quiesce, and
stayed clean once the kill happened after quiescing the scheduling
source.
This mirrors commit f6ab594672d4 ("scsi: aic94xx: fix use-after-free in
device removal path"), but ISCI needs the kill after wait_for_stop().
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it