RHSA-2026:42078HighCVSS 9.0

Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 Product Security and Bug Fix Update

Published
July 20, 2026
Last Modified
September 6, 2026

🔗 CVE IDs covered (24)

📋 Description

CVE-2026-4800 — lodash: lodash: Arbitrary code execution via untrusted input in template imports CVE-2026-6321 — fast-uri: fast-uri: Path traversal vulnerability allows bypass of security policies CVE-2026-6322 — fast-uri: fast-uri: URI authority bypass due to improper delimiter handling CVE-2026-8643 — python-pip: Path traversal via malicious entry point name in pip wheel installation allows arbitrary file overwrite CVE-2026-11332 — ansible-core: argument injection in ansible-galaxy role install leads to arbitrary code execution CVE-2026-12382 — aap-gateway: missing requestHeadersToRemove allows mTLS bypass via Subject header spoofing CVE-2026-12701 — pulpcore: pulpcore: relative_path_validator bypass via directory traversal in FilesystemExport CVE-2026-25681 — golang.org/x/net/html: golang.org/x/net/html: Arbitrary code execution via Cross-Site Scripting CVE-2026-27136 — golang.org/x/net/html: golang: golang.org/x/net/html: Cross-Site Scripting via HTML parsing bypass CVE-2026-32281 — crypto/x509: golang: Go crypto/x509: Denial of Service via inefficient certificate chain validation CVE-2026-33811 — net: golang: Go net package: Denial of Service via long CNAME response in LookupCNAME CVE-2026-39821 — golang.org/x/net/idna: golang: net/http: golang.org/x/net/idna: Privilege escalation via incorrect Punycode label processing CVE-2026-42044 — axios: Axios: Invisible JSON Response Tampering via Prototype Pollution Gadget CVE-2026-42215 — GitPython: GitPython: Arbitrary command execution due to bypass of dangerous Git option checks CVE-2026-42284 — GitPython: GitPython: Arbitrary code execution via improper validation of clone options CVE-2026-44244 — GitPython: GitPython: Arbitrary code execution via injected newlines in Git configuration CVE-2026-44432 — urllib3: urllib3: Denial of Service due to excessive HTTP response decompression CVE-2026-44486 — axios: Axios: Information disclosure of proxy credentials via HTTP redirects CVE-2026-44487 — axios: Axios: Information disclosure of proxy credentials via redirect flows CVE-2026-44488 — axios: Axios: Denial of Service due to unenforced request and response size limits CVE-2026-44492 — axios: Axios: Proxy bypass via IPv4-mapped IPv6 address non-normalization CVE-2026-44494 — axios: Axios: Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack via Prototype Pollution CVE-2026-44495 — axios: Axios: Information disclosure due to prototype pollution vulnerability CVE-2026-44496 — axios: Axios: Client-side Denial of Service via unescaped regex metacharacters in XSRF cookie name

🎯 Affected products140

  • Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8
  • Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9
  • ansible-core-1:2.16.19-1.el8ap.noarch as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8
  • ansible-core-1:2.16.19-1.el8ap.src as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8
  • ansible-core-1:2.16.19-1.el9ap.noarch as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9
  • ansible-core-1:2.16.19-1.el9ap.src as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9
  • ansible-test-1:2.16.19-1.el8ap.noarch as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8
  • ansible-test-1:2.16.19-1.el9ap.noarch as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9
  • automation-controller-0:4.6.30-2.el8ap.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8
  • automation-controller-0:4.6.30-2.el8ap.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8
  • automation-controller-0:4.6.30-2.el8ap.s390x as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8
  • automation-controller-0:4.6.30-2.el8ap.src as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8
  • automation-controller-0:4.6.30-2.el8ap.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8
  • automation-controller-0:4.6.30-2.el9ap.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9
  • automation-controller-0:4.6.30-2.el9ap.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9
  • automation-controller-0:4.6.30-2.el9ap.s390x as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9
  • automation-controller-0:4.6.30-2.el9ap.src as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9
  • automation-controller-0:4.6.30-2.el9ap.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9
  • automation-controller-cli-0:4.6.30-2.el8ap.noarch as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8
  • automation-controller-cli-0:4.6.30-2.el9ap.noarch as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9
  • automation-controller-server-0:4.6.30-2.el8ap.noarch as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8
  • automation-controller-server-0:4.6.30-2.el9ap.noarch as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9
  • automation-controller-ui-0:4.6.30-2.el8ap.noarch as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8
  • automation-controller-ui-0:4.6.30-2.el9ap.noarch as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9
  • automation-controller-venv-tower-0:4.6.30-2.el8ap.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8
  • automation-controller-venv-tower-0:4.6.30-2.el8ap.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8
  • automation-controller-venv-tower-0:4.6.30-2.el8ap.s390x as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8
  • automation-controller-venv-tower-0:4.6.30-2.el8ap.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8
  • automation-controller-venv-tower-0:4.6.30-2.el9ap.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9
  • automation-controller-venv-tower-0:4.6.30-2.el9ap.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9
  • +110 more not shown

✅ Remediation

For details on how to apply this update, refer to Ansible Automation Platform documentation. Workaround: Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base or stability. Workaround: To mitigate this issue, users should avoid installing Python wheels from untrusted sources. It is strongly advised against using `pip install` with elevated privileges, such as `sudo`, when installing wheels. Additionally, administrators should inspect `entry_points.txt` within wheels for path separators or absolute paths before installation. Workaround: Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability. Workaround: The following practices would help for avoiding exposure and mitigate this flaw: - Restrict network access to the non-mTLS EDA event stream route (/eda-event-streams/) at the firewall or load balancer level, allowing only trusted internal sources. - If mTLS-protected event streams are in use, ensure that only the /mtls/eda-event-streams/ route is accessible from untrusted networks. - Monitor EDA event stream activity for unexpected events_received counter increases that may indicate unauthorized event injection. - Review Envoy proxy logs for requests to the non-mTLS event stream route from unexpected source IPs. Workaround: There is no complete mitigation for this vulnerability. The following measures can reduce risk: 1. If FilesystemExport was never configured on your deployment, you are not affected by this issue. 2. If FilesystemExporters exist in the database, audit them for path traversal sequences ("../"). Existing malicious entries must be cleaned up manually, as the validation functions documented to raise ValidationError do not actually do so in all code paths. 3. Restrict admin-level access to the Pulp API to only trusted operators. Review and audit which accounts have administrator privileges. 4. Ensure SELinux is in enforcing mode on Satellite/Pulp servers to limit the directories the Pulp service user can write to. 5. Monitor filesystem changes outside of expected Pulp directories for signs of exploitation. Workaround: To mitigate this flaw, applications processing untrusted HTML input must implement strict input sanitization and ensure all output is properly encoded before rendering. Deploying a comprehensive Content Security Policy (CSP) can restrict script execution, further reducing the attack surface. Administrators should review application configurations to ensure adequate protection against XSS. Workaround: To mitigate this issue, applications can be configured to use the pure Go DNS resolver instead of the `cgo` DNS resolver. This can be achieved by setting the `GODEBUG` environment variable to `netdns=go`. For example, to run a Go application with this mitigation: `GODEBUG=netdns=go /path/to/your/go/application`. This change may require restarting affected applications or services to take effect. Users should verify that this change does not negatively impact DNS resolution for their specific application environment. Workaround: Upgrade to a fixed golang.org/x/net release that includes the idna correction, via updated golang or dependent package rebuilds. Workaround: To mitigate this issue, applications that use GitPython and process untrusted input for Git configuration values must implement robust input validation and sanitization. This prevents the injection of newlines that could manipulate `core.hooksPath` and lead to arbitrary code execution. Additionally, ensure that applications interacting with Git repositories operate with the principle of least privilege to limit the potential impact of any successful exploitation.

🔗 References (26)