CVE-2026-52733

MEDIUMPre-NVD 6.56.5
EchelonGraph scoreLOW confidence

This medium-severity CVE scores 6.5 under the CNA's CVSS (NVD's own analysis pending). EPSS exploit-prediction score not yet available (the EPSS model rescores nightly; freshly-published CVEs typically appear within 48 hours). GitHub Security Advisory data not yet ingested — confidence will rise once GHSA publishes (typical lag: hours to days for open-source ecosystem CVEs; never for infrastructure-only CVEs).

Triggered by: NVD CVSS baseline
Sources: cna:github_m
6.5
EchelonGraph verdictMonitorLow exploitation likelihood right now — keep watching.
  • Lower severity and no public exploit yet
CISA-KEV: Not listedEPSS: —CVSS: 6.5Exploit: NoneExposed: 0

No vendor fix yet — apply a workaround or compensating control (WAF / firewall / segmentation) and watch for a patch.

zebrad has persistent on-disk corruption of Sapling/Orchard subtree roots after chain fork via pop_tip

Am I affected

You are affected if:

  • You run zebrad up to and including v4.4.1.
  • Your node participates in a network where chain forks occur (mainnet, testnet, or any network with multiple miners).

All default configurations are affected. The corruption persists across restarts because it is written to RocksDB.

Summary

When pop_tip removes the tip block during a chain fork, stale Sapling and Orchard note commitment subtree root data is retained in the in-memory non-finalized state. When the chain subsequently finalizes, this stale data is written to the persistent RocksDB state. The corrupted subtree root history affects z_getsubtreesbyindex (used by lightwalletd for wallet synchronization) and could affect future chain verification that depends on correct subtree roots.

Details

The non-finalized state provides two methods for removing blocks: pop_root (removes the oldest block during finalization) and pop_tip (removes the newest block during a fork revert). pop_root correctly cleans up note commitment subtree contributions. pop_tip does not: it removes the block but retains the block's subtree root contributions in the in-memory state.

When a chain fork occurs and pop_tip reverts the old tip, the winning fork's chain is extended. When that chain is later finalized, the stale subtree data from the reverted blocks is included in the RocksDB write batch and persisted to disk.

The pop_root/pop_tip asymmetry is specific to subtree root handling. Other state managed by pop_tip (nullifiers, UTXOs, anchors, block hashes) uses different cleanup patterns that are not affected.

Patches

zebra-state 7.0.0 and zebrad 4.5.0.

The fix adds subtree root cleanup to pop_tip matching the pattern already used by pop_root.

Workarounds

There is no configuration-level workaround. Chain forks are natural events on any Proof-of-Work network. Operators can mitigate the downstream impact by periodically verifying subtree root consistency using z_getsubtreesbyindex against a known-good reference.

Impact

Persistent corruption of Sapling and Orchard subtree root history in the RocksDB state database. The corruption survives node restarts. Downstream consumers that rely on z_getsubtreesbyindex for wallet synchronization (primarily lightwalletd and light wallets) receive incorrect subtree roots. This does not directly affect consensus validation of new blocks but can cause wallet synchronization failures or incorrect wallet state. Recovery requires rebuilding the state database from scratch.

Credit

Reported by @dingledropper via a private GitHub Security Advisory submission.

CVSS v3
6.5
EG Score
6.5(low)
EPSS
—
KEV
Not listed

Published

July 2, 2026

Last Modified

July 2, 2026

Vendor Advisories for CVE-2026-52733(1)

These vendors published their own advisory mentioning this CVE — often with vendor-specific remediation steps + affected product lists not in NVD.

Data Freshness Timeline

(refreshed 5× in last 7d / 5× in last 30d)

Each row is a source pipeline that fetched or updated this CVE on that date, with what changed. For example, "NVD update" means NVD published or revised its analysis for this CVE; "MITRE cvelistV5" means we ingested or refreshed it from the CNA feed. Most recent first.

  1. 2026-07-06 18:36 UTCEG score recompute
  2. 2026-07-05 19:12 UTCEG score recompute
  3. 2026-07-04 19:50 UTCEG score recompute
  4. 2026-07-03 20:28 UTCEG score recompute
  5. 2026-07-02 21:06 UTCEG score recompute

Frequently asked(4)

What is CVE-2026-52733?
CVE-2026-52733 is a medium vulnerability published on July 2, 2026. zebrad has persistent on-disk corruption of Sapling/Orchard subtree roots after chain fork via pop_tip Am I affected You are affected if: 1. You run zebrad up to and including v4.4.1. 2. Your node participates in a network where chain forks occur (mainnet, testnet, or any network with multiple…
When was CVE-2026-52733 disclosed?
CVE-2026-52733 was first published in the National Vulnerability Database on July 2, 2026. EchelonGraph re-ingests CVE updates from NVD on a 2-hour cycle, so this page reflects the latest published state.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-52733?
CVE-2026-52733 has a CVSS v4.0 base score of 6.5 (CNA self-assessment; NVD's own analysis pending). The EG score is currently aggregating — additional source signals are being incorporated as they become available..
How do I remediate CVE-2026-52733?
Patch to the fixed version published by the affected vendor. Where vendor advisories exist for CVE-2026-52733, EchelonGraph cross-links them in the Vendor Advisories panel below — those typically contain the canonical remediation steps, fixed version numbers, and any vendor-specific mitigations.

Dependency Blast Radius

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