CVE-2026-52738

MEDIUMPre-NVD 0.0
0.0
EchelonGraph verdictMonitorLow exploitation likelihood right now — keep watching.
  • No confirmed exploitation signals yet
CISA-KEV: Not listedEPSS: —CVSS: —Exploit: NoneExposed: 0

No vendor fix yet — apply a workaround or compensating control (WAF / firewall / segmentation) and watch for a patch.

Zebra: Finalized address balance credit-first overflow on consensus-valid blocks

Am I affected

You are affected if:

  • You run zebrad up to and including v4.4.1.
  • Your node processes blocks on any Zcash network.

Summary

The finalized transparent address balance writer processes all newly-created outputs (credits) before processing spent outputs (debits) within the same block. A consensus-valid block containing a long chain of same-address transparent self-spends can cause the intermediate per-address balance during the credit pass to exceed MAX_MONEY, triggering a panic in the finalized state writer.

Because the triggering block is consensus-valid (zcashd accepts it), the panic recurs on restart when the node re-encounters the same block. This creates a persistent chain halt that can only be resolved by a software patch.

Details

The finalized state writer at zebra-state/src/service/finalized_state/zebra_db/transparent.rs iterates all transaction outputs in a block and credits them to per-address balances before iterating inputs and debiting spent outputs. When a block contains many transparent self-spends to the same address, the intermediate credit-only balance can exceed the MAX_MONEY supply cap even though the final net balance (credits minus debits) is valid.

The code panics on the intermediate overflow via .expect() on the balance addition. Under Zebra's panic = "abort" release profile, this terminates the process. On restart, the node re-downloads and re-processes the same consensus-valid block, triggering the same panic.

An attacker with approximately 1,100–2,100 ZEC and mining capability can construct a block that permanently halts all Zebra nodes. The attacker recovers their capital (the self-spends return funds to the same address), so the net cost is the mining effort only.

Patches

Patched in Zebra 4.4.2. The fix processes credits and debits together per transaction rather than all credits then all debits, matching zcashd's approach.

Workarounds

No workaround is available. Upgrade to Zebra 4.4.2.

Impact

A single consensus-valid mined block can permanently halt all Zebra nodes on the network. The halt persists across restarts. Recovery requires deploying a patched version. Downstream consumers (light wallets, exchanges, mining infrastructure) lose service for the duration of the halt.

Credit

Reported by @sangsoo-osec.

CVSS v3
—
EG Score
0.0(none)
EPSS
—
KEV
Not listed

Published

July 2, 2026

Last Modified

July 2, 2026

Vendor Advisories for CVE-2026-52738(1)

These vendors published their own advisory mentioning this CVE — often with vendor-specific remediation steps + affected product lists not in NVD.

Data Freshness Timeline

(refreshed 1× in last 7d / 1× in last 30d)

Each row is a source pipeline that fetched or updated this CVE on that date, with what changed. For example, "NVD update" means NVD published or revised its analysis for this CVE; "MITRE cvelistV5" means we ingested or refreshed it from the CNA feed. Most recent first.

  1. 2026-07-02 20:07 UTCEG score recompute

Frequently asked(3)

What is CVE-2026-52738?
CVE-2026-52738 is a medium vulnerability published on July 2, 2026. Zebra: Finalized address balance credit-first overflow on consensus-valid blocks Am I affected You are affected if: 1. You run zebrad up to and including v4.4.1. 2. Your node processes blocks on any Zcash network. Summary The finalized transparent address balance writer processes all newly-created…
When was CVE-2026-52738 disclosed?
CVE-2026-52738 was first published in the National Vulnerability Database on July 2, 2026. EchelonGraph re-ingests CVE updates from NVD on a 2-hour cycle, so this page reflects the latest published state.
How do I remediate CVE-2026-52738?
Patch to the fixed version published by the affected vendor. Where vendor advisories exist for CVE-2026-52738, EchelonGraph cross-links them in the Vendor Advisories panel below — those typically contain the canonical remediation steps, fixed version numbers, and any vendor-specific mitigations.

Dependency Blast Radius

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