CVE-2026-47415

praisonai-platform: Issue endpoints accept any issue_id without workspace ownership check, cross-workspace read/update/delete IDOR

Summary

Type: Insecure Direct Object Reference. The issue CRUD endpoints (GET / PATCH / DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}) gate access on require_workspace_member(workspace_id) only, then resolve issue_id through IssueService.get(issue_id) which is a primary-key lookup with no workspace constraint. A user who is a member of any workspace W1 can read, modify, or delete issues that belong to a different workspace W2. File: src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/issue_service.py, lines 72-156; route handlers at src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/issues.py, lines 82-137. Root cause: the route extracts workspace_id from the URL path, uses it solely for the membership gate, then calls IssueService.get(issue_id) / IssueService.update(issue_id, ...) / IssueService.delete(issue_id) without re-checking which workspace the issue actually belongs to. IssueService.get runs a single-key lookup; update and delete call self.get(issue_id) first and then mutate the returned row, inheriting the same gap. The MemberService in this same codebase uses a composite (workspace_id, user_id) key, proving the author knows the safe pattern; it was simply not applied to the issue, agent, project, comment, or label services.

Affected Code

File 1: src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/issue_service.py, lines 72-75 and 97-156.

class IssueService:
    ...
    async def get(self, issue_id: str) -> Optional[Issue]:
        """Get issue by ID."""
        return await self._session.get(Issue, issue_id)             # <-- BUG: no workspace_id predicate
    async def update(
        self,
        issue_id: str,
        title: Optional[str] = None,
        ...
    ) -> Optional[Issue]:
        issue = await self.get(issue_id)                            # <-- inherits the same gap
        if issue is None:
            return None
        ...
        return issue
    async def delete(self, issue_id: str) -> bool:
        issue = await self.get(issue_id)                            # <-- inherits the same gap
        if issue is None:
            return False
        await self._session.delete(issue)
        await self._session.flush()
        return True

File 2: src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/issues.py, lines 82-137.

@router.get("/{issue_id}", response_model=IssueResponse)
async def get_issue(
    workspace_id: str,
    issue_id: str,
    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),         # only checks membership in workspace_id
    session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
    svc = IssueService(session)
    issue = await svc.get(issue_id)                                 # <-- workspace_id never threaded through
    if issue is None:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Issue not found")
    return IssueResponse.model_validate(issue)
@router.patch("/{issue_id}", response_model=IssueResponse)
async def update_issue(
    workspace_id: str,
    issue_id: str,
    body: IssueUpdate,
    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),
    session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
    svc = IssueService(session)
    issue = await svc.update(                                       # <-- writes to any issue in the DB
        issue_id, title=body.title, description=body.description,
        status=body.status, priority=body.priority,
        assignee_type=body.assignee_type, assignee_id=body.assignee_id,
        project_id=body.project_id,
    )
    ...

delete_issue (lines 127-137) repeats the pattern.

Why it's wrong: workspace_id from the route is used solely as a membership predicate ("are you in some workspace W?"), never as a resource-ownership predicate ("is the issue you are addressing actually inside W?"). The standard FastAPI/SQLAlchemy fix is to make the resource-lookup query include the workspace constraint and treat absence as 404, so a foreign-workspace issue is indistinguishable from a non-existent one. The update_issue handler additionally allows the attacker to overwrite project_id, which can re-assign the foreign issue to an unrelated project the attacker also does not own — escalating the scope of the write primitive.

Exploit Chain

• Attacker registers a workspace W_attacker (where they are a member) and harvests a target issue UUID I_T from any side channel: the activity feed (activity.py:log records issue_id=...), comment threads, error messages, exported issue dumps, issue mentions in agent prompts, or operator screenshots. Issue IDs are uuid4 strings but they are not secret. State: attacker holds I_T.
• Attacker authenticates and POSTs Authorization: Bearer to GET /workspaces/W_attacker/issues/I_T. require_workspace_member(W_attacker, attacker) passes (attacker is a member of W_attacker). State: control flow enters get_issue with workspace_id=W_attacker, issue_id=I_T.
• IssueService.get(I_T) runs session.get(Issue, "I_T"), which is SELECT * FROM issues WHERE id = 'I_T' LIMIT 1 with no workspace_id = 'W_attacker' filter. The row is returned in full — including title, description (often confidential bug-report content, customer PII, embedded credentials, or internal roadmap data), status, priority, assignee_id, created_by, and project_id. State: response body is the JSON-serialised foreign issue.
• Attacker repeats with PATCH /workspaces/W_attacker/issues/I_T and a body of {"description": "", "status": "closed", "project_id": ""}. update_issue calls svc.update(I_T, ...) which loads the target row and mutates the listed fields. State: the foreign workspace's issue is silently re-described, re-statused, and re-projected.
• Attacker calls DELETE /workspaces/W_attacker/issues/I_T to destroy the target issue. IssueService.delete loads the row and calls session.delete(). State: target issue is gone from the foreign workspace.
• Final state: any attacker with one workspace-member token can enumerate, exfiltrate, rewrite, and delete every issue in the multi-tenant deployment given the issue UUIDs (which leak through the side channels above). The act_svc.log(workspace_id, "issue.updated", "issue", issue.id, ...) call at line 118 records the event under W_attacker rather than W_target, so the foreign workspace's audit trail does not record the tampering — making detection harder.

Security Impact

Severity: sec-high. CVSS 8.1: network attack, low complexity, low privileges (any workspace member), no user interaction, scope unchanged, high confidentiality (full issue body including any embedded secrets), high integrity (arbitrary writes including project re-assignment), low availability (DELETE wipes target issues). Attacker capability: with one workspace-member token plus a harvested issue UUID, an attacker reads the target issue's title, description, status, priority, assignee_id, and project_id; rewrites any of those fields (silent edit, false closure, malicious re-assignment); re-projects the issue to an unrelated project to confuse triagers; or deletes the issue altogether to destroy evidence of customer reports. Preconditions: praisonai-platform is deployed multi-tenant; the attacker has any membership token; the target issue's UUID is known or guessable (UUIDs leak through activity feeds, comment threads, error messages, exported dumps, and operator screenshots). Differential: source-inspection-verified end-to-end. The asymmetry between IssueService.get(issue_id) (no workspace check) and MemberService.get(workspace_id, user_id) (composite key check) in the same codebase confirms the pattern. With the suggested fix below applied, IssueService.get(workspace_id, issue_id) returns None for foreign-workspace issues, the route handler returns 404, and the foreign data is indistinguishable from a missing record.

Suggested Fix

Make every single-row resource lookup take the workspace predicate; treat foreign-workspace rows as 404.

--- a/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/issue_service.py
+++ b/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/issue_service.py
@@ -69,9 +69,12 @@ class IssueService:
         await self._session.flush()
         return issue
async def get(self, issue_id: str) -> Optional[Issue]:
"""Get issue by ID."""
return await self._session.get(Issue, issue_id)
+    async def get(self, workspace_id: str, issue_id: str) -> Optional[Issue]:
+        """Get issue by ID, scoped to a workspace."""
+        stmt = select(Issue).where(
+            Issue.id == issue_id, Issue.workspace_id == workspace_id
+        )
+        return (await self._session.execute(stmt)).scalar_one_or_none()
     async def update(
         self,
+        workspace_id: str,
         issue_id: str,
         ...
     ) -> Optional[Issue]:
issue = await self.get(issue_id)
+        issue = await self.get(workspace_id, issue_id)
         ...
async def delete(self, issue_id: str) -> bool:
+    async def delete(self, workspace_id: str, issue_id: str) -> bool:
issue = await self.get(issue_id)
+        issue = await self.get(workspace_id, issue_id)

Update the route handlers in routes/issues.py to thread workspace_id through. The same pattern (single-key resource lookup gated only by workspace-member check) exists in AgentService, ProjectService, CommentService, and LabelService; each is a separate exploitable IDOR and should be filed as its own advisory so each gets a CVE.