RHSA-2026:74771HighCVSS 8.8

Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat AI Base Images 3.5.2 (Gaudi)

Published
October 1, 2026
Last Modified
October 5, 2026

🔗 CVE IDs covered (35)

CVE-2026-58014 →CVE-2026-64830 →CVE-2026-57455 →CVE-2026-57456 →CVE-2026-16118 →CVE-2026-73076 →CVE-2025-6170 →CVE-2026-52858 →CVE-2026-55693 →CVE-2026-56211 →CVE-2026-58010 →CVE-2026-60002 →CVE-2026-73072 →CVE-2026-58013 →CVE-2026-59856 →CVE-2026-59858 →CVE-2026-73066 →CVE-2026-15308 →CVE-2026-56209 →CVE-2026-58011 →CVE-2026-66036 →CVE-2026-73077 →CVE-2026-15588 →CVE-2026-47162 →CVE-2026-54369 →CVE-2026-58015 →CVE-2026-58049 →CVE-2026-66039 →CVE-2026-64834 →CVE-2026-11940 →CVE-2026-47167 →CVE-2026-58012 →CVE-2026-73078 →CVE-2026-56208 →CVE-2026-56210 →

📋 Description

CVE-2025-6170 — libxml2: Stack Buffer Overflow in xmllint Interactive Shell Command Handling CVE-2026-11940 — python: cpython: CPython: tarfile extraction filter bypass allows escaping the destination directory CVE-2026-15308 — python: Python: CPU Denial of Service in HTML parser via repeated unterminated markup declarations CVE-2026-15588 — GDBusServer: glib2: GDBusServer pre-authentication DoS via unbounded SASL line buffering CVE-2026-16118 — xdgmime: heap-based buffer overflow in _xdg_mime_magic_parse_magic_line() in xdgmimemagic.c CVE-2026-47162 — vim: Vim: Arbitrary Code Execution via crafted directory names CVE-2026-47167 — vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via crafted step-definition patterns CVE-2026-52858 — vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via Python omni-completion CVE-2026-54369 — acl: Symlink traversal privilege escalation via libacl functions CVE-2026-55693 — vim: Vim: Out-of-bounds Write in Spell File Word Count CVE-2026-56208 — libaom: libaom: heap buffer overflow in AV1 encoder first-pass stats buffer via LAP mode CVE-2026-56209 — libaom: libaom: arbitrary address write via SVC layer context OOB and cyclic refresh map pointer hijack CVE-2026-56210 — libaom: libaom: heap-buffer-overflow read via missing bounds check in ctrl_set_layer_id CVE-2026-56211 — libaom: libaom: remote code execution via SVC layer context handling with attacker-controlled frames CVE-2026-57455 — vim: Vim: Denial of Service via stack out-of-bounds write in spell_soundfold_sofo() CVE-2026-57456 — vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via malicious docstrings in Python omni-completion CVE-2026-58010 — glib: buffer over-read in glib/gvariant-serialiser.c via gvs_tuple_is_normal() CVE-2026-58011 — glib: out-of-bounds read in glib/gdatetime.c:g_date_time_get_ymd via invalid GDateTime CVE-2026-58012 — glib: buffer over-read in g_regex_replace() via glib/gregex.c:string_append() and g_utf8_next_char() CVE-2026-58013 — glib: buffer over-read in glib/giochannel.c via "g_io_channel_read_line_backend" CVE-2026-58014 — glib: off-by-one error in glib/gkeyfile.c via "g_key_file_get_locale_string_list" CVE-2026-58015 — glib: path traversal in glib/gio/gdbusauthmechanismsha1.c via keyring_lookup_entry and mechanism_client_data_receive CVE-2026-58049 — FFmpeg: FFmpeg: Memory corruption via crafted RASC video stream CVE-2026-59856 — vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via crafted PHP file in omni-completion CVE-2026-59858 — vim: Vim: Arbitrary command execution via crafted tags file in C omni-completion CVE-2026-60002 — openssh: OpenSSH: Use-after-free vulnerability during host key re-exchange on the client side CVE-2026-64830 — ffmpeg: FFmpeg: Arbitrary code execution via heap buffer overflow in VobSub subtitle demuxer. CVE-2026-64834 — FFmpeg: Denial of Service via crafted RTP/ASF stream CVE-2026-66036 — ffmpeg: FFmpeg: Arbitrary code execution via crafted video in vf_hqdn3d filter CVE-2026-66039 — ffmpeg: FFmpeg: Arbitrary code execution via crafted CAF file CVE-2026-73066 — tesseract: Tesseract: Heap out-of-bounds write via crafted .traineddata CVE-2026-73072 — vim: Vim: Heap buffer overflow allows arbitrary code execution CVE-2026-73076 — vim: Vim: Arbitrary command execution via crafted vimball CVE-2026-73077 — vim: Vim: Arbitrary Code Execution via Insecure Shell Command Handling CVE-2026-73078 — vim: Vim: Arbitrary Code Execution via Crafted Netrw Menu Entries

🎯 Affected products2

  • Red Hat OpenShift AI 3.5
  • registry.redhat.io/rhai/base-image-gaudi-rhel9@sha256:b7687a7830f087ca8b1cc3b897e8ea4991d649bfa4492d552d0192be05056c97_amd64 as a component of Red Hat OpenShift AI 3.5

✅ Remediation

For more information visit https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:74771 Workaround: Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to a widespread installation base, or stability. It is strongly recommended to apply the upstream patch once available. Workaround: Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability. Workaround: Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base or stability. Workaround: Do not install a MIME magic file or content from untrusted sources. Workaround: To mitigate this issue, users should exercise caution when opening untrusted files or repositories with Vim, particularly those that might trigger the `cucumber` filetype plugin. Avoiding interaction with untrusted content can prevent the execution of malicious step-definition patterns. Workaround: Users can mitigate this vulnerability by disabling Python omni-completion in Vim if it is not essential for their workflow. This prevents the execution of untrusted Python code when opening hostile files. To disable this feature, ensure that the `omnifunc` option in your Vim configuration (e.g., `~/.vimrc`) is not set to `pythoncomplete#Complete` or `python3complete#Complete`. Alternatively, users should avoid invoking omni-completion (`Ctrl-X Ctrl-O`) on Python files from untrusted sources. Disabling Python omni-completion may affect Python development functionality within Vim. Workaround: Restrict unprivileged users from creating symlinks in directories that privileged processes operate on with ACL commands. Where possible, use the fs.protected_symlinks sysctl (enabled by default on RHEL 7+), which prevents symlink following in world-writable sticky directories unless the owner of the symlink matches the owner of the target file or directory. Workaround: There is no complete mitigation for this vulnerability. The following measures can reduce risk: 1. If using libaom as a standalone encoder library, avoid setting g_lag_in_frames to values >= 1 when processing untrusted input, or validate all encoder configuration parameters before passing them to the libaom API. 2. For Firefox and Thunderbird, ensure browsers are updated to versions that include the patched libaom (v3.14.0 or later). 3. For standalone libaom deployments (RHEL-AI, Hummingbird), restrict access to the encoding service to trusted clients only. 4. Apply network-level access controls to limit who can submit video for encoding. Workaround: There is no complete mitigation for this vulnerability. The following measures can reduce risk: 1. If using libaom as a standalone encoder library with SVC enabled, validate that spatial_layer_id and temporal_layer_id values are within the configured range [0, configured_layers) before calling aom_codec_control with AV1E_SET_SVC_LAYER_ID. 2. Restrict access to encoding services to trusted clients only. Do not expose libaom SVC encoder configuration to untrusted input. 3. For Firefox and Thunderbird, ensure browsers are updated to versions that include the patched libaom (v3.14.0 or later). 4. Deploy encoding services with ASLR, stack canaries, and other exploit mitigation technologies enabled. Workaround: There is no complete mitigation for this vulnerability. The following measures can reduce risk: 1. If using libaom as a standalone encoder library with SVC enabled, validate that spatial_layer_id does not exceed the number of configured spatial layers before calling aom_codec_control with AV1E_SET_SVC_LAYER_ID. 2. Restrict access to encoding services to trusted clients only. 3. For Firefox and Thunderbird, ensure browsers are updated to versions that include the patched libaom (v3.14.0 or later). 4. Monitor encoding service processes for unexpected crashes (segfaults) that may indicate exploitation attempts. Workaround: There is no complete mitigation for this vulnerability. The following measures can reduce risk: 1. If using libaom as a standalone encoder in a fork-based service, validate all SVC layer parameters (spatial_layer_id, temporal_layer_id) against configured bounds before passing them to the encoder API. 2. Avoid fork-based architectures for encoding services that accept untrusted input. Use thread-based or container-isolated workers instead, which prevent crash oracle attacks. 3. Restrict access to encoding services to trusted clients only. Do not expose SVC encoder configuration or frame submission to untrusted network input. 4. For Firefox and Thunderbird, ensure browsers are updated to versions that include the patched libaom (v3.14.0 or later). 5. Enable all available exploit mitigations (ASLR, PIE, stack canaries, CFI) on encoding service binaries. Workaround: To mitigate this issue disable spell checking or avoid using SOFO-based spell files. This can be achieved globally by adding set nospell to your ~/.vimrc configuration file. Ensure your systems utilize standard UTF-8 encoding. This flaw is strictly confined to legacy 8-bit encodings and cannot be triggered under default Red Hat configurations. Workaround: To mitigate this vulnerability, users should avoid opening untrusted Python files or using Python omni-completion on such files. If Python omni-completion is not required, it can be disabled by adding `autocmd FileType python setlocal omnifunc=` to your `.vimrc` file. This will prevent the vulnerable code from being executed. Disabling Python omni-completion will remove the ability to use `Ctrl-X Ctrl-O` for Python code completion. A restart of Vim is required for the changes to take effect. Workaround: To mitigate this vulnerability, in applications processing user-supplied dates, implement input validation to ensure the supplied date is within the supported range before calling g_date_time_add_full() with untrusted data, specifically rejecting inputs that result in a negative or zero days field. Workaround: To mitigate this vulnerability, implement strict input validation to sanitize user-supplied replacement strings, specifically rejecting or escaping case-change modifiers (\u, \l, \U, \L) before calling g_regex_replace() or g_regex_replace_eval() when the G_REGEX_RAW compile flag is used. Removing the G_REGEX_RAW flag or hardcoding the replacement strings will completely neutralize this issue. Workaround: To mitigate this vulnerability, restrict any custom line terminator string passed to g_io_channel_set_line_term() to a maximum length of one byte before calling g_io_channel_read_line_backend(). Using the default line terminators will completely neutralize this issue. Workaround: To mitigate this vulnerability, implement input validation to sanitize untrusted key files (such as .desktop or .ini files), specifically rejecting or stripping empty values before calling g_key_file_get_locale_string_list(). Alternatively, restricting the application to only load key files from trusted sources will completely neutralize this issue. Workaround: To mitigate this vulnerability, ensure that applications only connect to trusted D-Bus servers and operate within secure, isolated networks to prevent man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks. If feasible, configuring the D-Bus connection to strictly require the EXTERNAL authentication mechanism and disabling DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 will completely neutralize this issue. Workaround: Users should exercise caution when opening untrusted PHP files and avoid invoking omni-completion on them. To prevent exploitation, the PHP omni-completion script can be disabled by moving or renaming `phpcomplete.vim`. For example, execute `mv /…

🔗 References (39)