RHSA-2026:35387HighCVSS 7.8

Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Hardened Images RPMs bug fix and enhancement update

Published
July 3, 2026
Last Modified
August 24, 2026

🔗 CVE IDs covered (5)

CVE-2026-55892 →CVE-2026-57456 →CVE-2026-59856 →CVE-2026-59857 →CVE-2026-59858 →

📋 Description

CVE-2026-55892 — vim: Vim: Denial of Service via crafted spell file CVE-2026-57456 — vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via malicious docstrings in Python omni-completion CVE-2026-59856 — vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via crafted PHP file in omni-completion CVE-2026-59857 — vim: Vim: Denial of Service via out-of-bounds write in spell sound-folding CVE-2026-59858 — vim: Vim: Arbitrary command execution via crafted tags file in C omni-completion

🎯 Affected products5

  • Red Hat Hardened Images
  • vim-main@aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
  • vim-main@noarch as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
  • vim-main@src as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
  • vim-main@x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images

✅ Remediation

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://images.redhat.com/ Workaround: Do not load untrusted spell files (.spl) from unknown sources. Avoid using :spelldump with spell files of unknown provenance. Workaround: To mitigate this vulnerability, users should avoid opening untrusted Python files or using Python omni-completion on such files. If Python omni-completion is not required, it can be disabled by adding `autocmd FileType python setlocal omnifunc=` to your `.vimrc` file. This will prevent the vulnerable code from being executed. Disabling Python omni-completion will remove the ability to use `Ctrl-X Ctrl-O` for Python code completion. A restart of Vim is required for the changes to take effect. Workaround: Users should exercise caution when opening untrusted PHP files and avoid invoking omni-completion on them. To prevent exploitation, the PHP omni-completion script can be disabled by moving or renaming `phpcomplete.vim`. For example, execute `mv /usr/share/vim/vim*/autoload/phpcomplete.vim /usr/share/vim/vim*/autoload/phpcomplete.vim.bak`. This action will disable PHP omni-completion functionality. A restart of Vim is necessary for this change to take effect. Workaround: This vulnerability can be mitigated by preventing Vim from automatically applying editor configurations embedded in files. Add the following line to the global /etc/vimrc or local ~/.vimrc configuration file: set nomodeline Workaround: Users are advised to avoid opening untrusted C source files or project tags files in Vim. Exercising caution and only processing trusted content prevents exploitation.

🔗 References (9)