RHSA-2026:26226HighCVSS 7.5

Red Hat Security Advisory: General availability of the satellite/iop-host-inventory-rhel9 container image

Published
June 16, 2026
Last Modified
August 21, 2026

🔗 CVE IDs covered (4)

📋 Description

CVE-2026-28684 — python-dotenv: python-dotenv: Arbitrary file overwrite via symbolic link following CVE-2026-32597 — pyjwt: PyJWT accepts unknown crit header extensions (RFC 7515 §4.1.11 MUST violation) CVE-2026-44431 — urllib3: urllib3: Information disclosure via cross-origin redirects forwarding sensitive headers CVE-2026-48710 — starlette: Starlette: Security restriction bypass via malformed HTTP Host header

🎯 Affected products2

  • Red Hat Satellite 6.18
  • registry.redhat.io/satellite/iop-host-inventory-rhel9@sha256:fe7bad4091d1e22b940b6f5cda351b4f0e92c0ff6107cf38041c5371ecef817a_amd64 as a component of Red Hat Satellite 6.18

✅ Remediation

For Red Hat Lightspeed in Satellite installation see the Red Hat Satellite documentation. Workaround: Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability. Workaround: Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base or stability. Workaround: Deploying an RFC-compliant reverse proxy (such as nginx, Apache, HAProxy, or Caddy) in front of the ASGI server will reject malformed Host headers before they reach the application. This is the most straightforward mitigation that does not require code changes. If custom middleware is present, it should be updated to use `request.scope["path"]` instead of `request.url.path` for any security decisions. The ASGI scope path is derived from the HTTP request line and is not influenced by the Host header, so it reflects the actual request target.

🔗 References (11)