In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: fix readdir position...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ocfs2: fix readdir position truncation on 32-bit kernels

In ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_el(), the directory cookie position is rebuilt with

ctx->pos = (ctx->pos & ~(sb->s_blocksize - 1)) | offset;

ctx->pos is loff_t (signed 64-bit), while sb->s_blocksize is unsigned long. On 32-bit kernels unsigned long is 32-bit, so the mask

~(sb->s_blocksize - 1)

is computed as a 32-bit unsigned value (e.g. 0xfffff000 for a 4 KiB block size). In the AND expression with the 64-bit ctx->pos, that unsigned operand is zero-extended to 64 bits per the usual arithmetic conversions, yielding 0x00000000fffff000. The high 32 bits of ctx->pos are silently cleared, even though directory size is allowed to exceed 4 GiB.

When readdir() crosses the 4 GiB boundary on a 32-bit kernel the position is reset back into the first 4 GiB block, making the re-validation path re-enumerate already-returned dirents indefinitely.

This is ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_el(), the extent-list readdir path taken for all non-inline directories, so a directory large enough to cross 4 GiB reaches it.

This is the same class of bug that commit 3dce5bb82c97 ("exfat: Fix bitwise operation having different size") fixed in exfat, and the fix mirrors the equivalent ext4 fix in this series. Cast the operand to loff_t so the mask is 64-bit before the AND:

ctx->pos = (ctx->pos & ~((loff_t)sb->s_blocksize - 1)) | offset;

64-bit kernels are unaffected.