In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SVM: Trigger new ASID allocation in both VMCBs on pCPU switch
When the pCPU where the VMCB was most recently used is switched, reset
the ASID generation in both VMCBs, triggering new ASID allocation for
the immediate VMRUN as well as the next VMRUN on the other VMCB.
The ASID is shared between vmcb01 and vmcb02, and gets flushed on every
nested transition. However, since pCPU tracking is done per VMCB, it is
possible for one VMCB to allocate a new ASID when migrated to a new
pCPU, and then the other VMCB reuses that ASID on the old pCPU. This can
result in the same ASID being used by multiple vCPUs on the old pCPU.
Example scenario:
- vCPU runs on pCPU A, vmcb01 is active, asid=1.
- vCPU migrates to pCPU B, vmcb01 pCPU changes, new asid=2.
- Another vCPU runs on pCPU A and allocates asid=2 as well.
- vCPU migrates back to pCPU A, and then switches to vmcb02 before it
runs again with vmcb01.
- No pCPU switch is detected for vmcb02, so VMRUN is done with asid=2.
- Two vCPUs end up using asid=2 on the same pCPU.
Keep the VMCB dirtying to the active VMCB only. Clean bits are tracked
by a pCPU for each VMCB, so do not unnecessarily dirty a VMCB if its
pCPU does not change.
Additionally, initialize the tracked pCPU for vmcb02 to -1 on nested
enablement as hardening, so that a new ASID allocation is always
triggered when nested is disabled and re-enabled.
No performance regression was noticed when overcommitting L1 vCPUs in L0
(to force rescheduling), pinning L1 <-> L2 vCPUs, and running CPUID in a
tight loop bouncing between 2 vCPUs in L2.
An alternative (and perhaps more proper) fix would be tracking the ASID
per-VMCB instead (e.g. [1]). However, that's a more involved change, and
it would result in having different ASIDs for L1 and L2 without actually
properly maintaining them. It would probably work because all TLB
flushes target the current VMCB, and the other VMCB is always flushed on
nested transitions, but the code ends up in an arguably more fragile
state. Punt a proper clean fix to an incoming (and overdue) overhaul of
SVM's ASID usage [2].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/[email protected]
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (8.8): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 8.8 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 8.8 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.a secondary CVSS source · CVSS v3.0 or v3.1
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-11-21). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it