In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mad: Fix receive buffer leak when PKey enforcement fails
ib_mad_complete_recv() initializes mad_recv_wc->rmpp_list and then runs
ib_mad_enforce_security() before linking recv_buf onto that list. On
failure it calls ib_free_recv_mad(), which only walks rmpp_list and frees
the ib_mad_private of every buffer found there. As the list is still
empty at that point, nothing is freed at all.
The caller cannot clean up either: ib_mad_recv_done() sets recv to NULL
right after ib_mad_complete_recv() returns, assuming the MAD layer took
ownership of the buffer. Every MAD that fails the PKey check therefore
leaks one ib_mad_private (about 300 bytes per IB port MAD, ~2K for OPA),
and a remote node can trigger this repeatedly by sending MADs with a
wrong PKey.
Link recv_buf onto rmpp_list right after the list is initialized, so the
error path has something to free.
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it