In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: do not let tcp_rmem be set below 4096
We can hit a division by zero crash in tcp_rcvbuf_grow() and tcp_rcv_space_adjust():
divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP RIP: 0010:tcp_rcvbuf_grow+0x187/0x450 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:939 ... grow = div_u64(((u64)rcvwin << 1) * (newval - oldval), oldval);
The division uses oldval = tp->rcvq_space.space as divisor. When tp->rcvq_space.space is zero, this leads to a divide-by-zero exception.
tp->rcvq_space.space is initialized in tcp_init_buffer_space(): tp->rcvq_space.space = min3(tp->rcv_ssthresh, tp->rcv_wnd, (u32)TCP_INIT_CWND * tp->advmss);
If tcp_rmem[1] is configured to very small values (such as 1), sk->sk_rcvbuf is initialized to 1. Then tcp_full_space(sk), which computes (sk->sk_rcvbuf * scaling_ratio) >> 8, truncates to 0. This sets tp->window_clamp = 0, tp->rcv_ssthresh = 0, and tp->rcvq_space.space = 0. Later, when data arrives and DRS is invoked, tcp_rcvbuf_grow() divides by oldval == 0.
Back in 2015, commit b1cb59cf2efe ("net: sysctl_net_core: check SNDBUF and RCVBUF for min length") ensured that net.core.rmem_default and net.core.rmem_max cannot be set below SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF. Similarly, SO_RCVBUF setsockopt enforces max_t(int, val * 2, SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF).
However, net.ipv4.tcp_rmem still had .extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE, allowing arbitrarily small values.
Because SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF depends on sizeof(struct sk_buff) and cacheline alignment, its value varies across architectures and configuration options. Using a fixed constant of 4096 ensures a predictable, architecture- independent lower bound that is safely above SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF everywhere and matches the documented 4K default.
Fix this by setting tcp_rmem.extra1 to 4096 and updating the documentation.