CVE-2026-80527

HIGHPre-NVD 7.57.5
EchelonGraph scoreMEDIUM confidence

“—” beside the score: it is equal to the CVSS score beside it.

Score 7.5 from GitHub Security Advisory (severity: HIGH) published 2026-08-27. A secondary CVSS source baseline 7.5; sources differ by 0.0.

Triggered by: GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
Sources: EPSS, GitHub Security Advisory, a secondary CVSS source

Also known asEUVD-2026-66593 (ENISA EUVD) · GHSA-q6xj-rvvg-h9r2 (GitHub Security Advisories)Source: ENISA EUVD

7.5EG
EchelonGraph verdictPlan a fixRemediate within your standard update timelines at low or medium mission impact and sooner than that at high (the SSVC decision on this page).
  • High severity, but no confirmed exploitation yet
CISA-KEV: Not listedEPSS PROB: 0.5%CVSS: 7.5Exploit: None knownExposed services: Not assessed

A fix is available — apply it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ceph: fix hanging __ceph_get_caps() with stale mds_wanted

A reader can hang forever in __ceph_get_caps() when the client no longer holds FILE_RD, but local cap state still says that the capability is already wanted (via mds_wanted).

One way to trigger this is through MDS cap revocation. If another client performs a conflicting operation, the MDS can revoke FILE_RD from the reader; the next read then has to reacquire FILE_RD. If the cap update that should request FILE_RD never reaches the MDS after cap->mds_wanted was raised, the reader is left holding only non-file caps while local mds_wanted still includes the file read caps.

In that state, try_get_cap_refs() sees need <= mds_wanted and returns 0, so __ceph_get_caps() just waits on i_cap_wq. If the cap update that was supposed to request FILE_RD never reaches the MDS after cap->mds_wanted was raised, no further request is sent and the waiter can sleep indefinitely until unrelated cap traffic happens to wake it up.

The ordering issue is that cap->mds_wanted is updated in __prep_cap() before the CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS message is actually queued for send. That makes one field serve two different meanings at once: what this client wants, and what the client believes the MDS already knows it wants.

A proper fix would be to split those states and track whether a cap update is actually in flight or has been observed by the MDS. However, simply moving the cap->mds_wanted assignment later would not be sufficient: queueing the message in the messenger does not guarantee that the MDS processed that specific wanted set, and reconnect or message loss can still invalidate that assumption. Fixing that properly would require a larger rework of the cap state machine.

To allow simpler backports to stable kernels, this patch implements a simpler workaround:

  • stop waiting forever in __ceph_get_caps(); after a bounded wait,
fall back to the renew path
  • make ceph_renew_caps() issue a synchronous OPEN request whenever
the inode still does not actually hold the wanted caps, instead of only calling ceph_check_caps()

The extra issued-vs-wanted check in ceph_renew_caps() is necessary because the previous test only checked whether the inode still had any real caps at all. That is not enough after revocation: the client can still hold something like pLs and yet be missing FILE_RD completely. In that case, falling back to ceph_check_caps() is not sufficient, because it still trusts cap->mds_wanted and may resend nothing. By requiring (issued & wanted) == wanted before taking the asynchronous path, the code only uses ceph_check_caps() when the wanted caps are already actually issued. Otherwise, it sends the synchronous OPEN renew.

This preserves the existing asynchronous fast path when the wanted caps are already issued, avoids changing cap-state semantics, and fixes the hang by guaranteeing that a stalled waiter eventually retries through a path that does not rely on the stale mds_wanted` state.

[ idryomov: move CEPH_GET_CAPS_WAIT_TIMEOUT from libceph.h to mds_client.h, formatting ]

CVSS v3
7.5
EG Score
7.5HIGHmedium confidence
EG Risk
49
EG Risk 49/100

EG Risk is EchelonGraph's 0–100 priority score. It fuses impact severity (EG Severity, the CVSS base score, never the KEV-floored or EPSS-lifted EG Score) with real-world exploitation and automatability, under weights EchelonGraph set by hand, so you can rank equal-severity CVEs and fix the most dangerous first. Higher = act sooner.

How it’s computed (value × EchelonGraph’s weight)
Severity75% × 45%
Impact severity (EG Severity): CVSS 7.5 of 10. Never the KEV-floored or EPSS-lifted EG Score.
Exploitation0.5% × 40%
FIRST EPSS: the 30-day exploitation probability when EchelonGraph scored this CVE.
Automatability100% × 15%
CISA's SSVC Automatable value: yes (Vulnrichment).
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph): Track at low or medium mission impact; Attend at high (mission-essential systems).
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable yes (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE.
Action: A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines at low or medium mission impact and sooner than that at high.
EPSS PROB
0.5%
EPSS %ILE
42nd
KEV
Not listed

What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)

The EG score (7.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 7.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.

EG Severity
7.5 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
EG Likelihood
0.5% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-24). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
Confirmed exploitation
None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
EG Priority
SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Attend at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; 60 days if it is not.Each input and its source: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.

SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Attend at high (mission-essential systems).

A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines at low or medium mission impact and sooner than that at high.

Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable yes (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table

BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; 60 days if it is not.

In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable yes (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it

Published

August 26, 2026

Last Modified

October 16, 2026

Advisory Details (8)

Auto-updated Aug 27, 2026
Patch available.
Web page

ceph: fix hanging __ceph_get_caps() with stale mds_wanted - kernel/git/stable/linux.git - Linux kernel stable tree

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fcce1b3be6d286aa80831e730289f4c062053ae6
Web page

ceph: fix hanging __ceph_get_caps() with stale mds_wanted - kernel/git/stable/linux.git - Linux kernel stable tree

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e05c315b4da0c16ea800ee4b2cb6c617f586d1b5
Web page

ceph: fix hanging __ceph_get_caps() with stale mds_wanted - kernel/git/stable/linux.git - Linux kernel stable tree

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b5661524c5a45085a866864ca9b8ae2513dfd67a
Web page

ceph: fix hanging __ceph_get_caps() with stale mds_wanted - kernel/git/stable/linux.git - Linux kernel stable tree

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a3bc6b3e9ef3f5f5cb85a902a30a090c7931127c
Web page

ceph: fix hanging __ceph_get_caps() with stale mds_wanted - kernel/git/stable/linux.git - Linux kernel stable tree

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9e55fe24c548ad3163903eb58bb002d28d32a630
Web page

ceph: fix hanging __ceph_get_caps() with stale mds_wanted - kernel/git/stable/linux.git - Linux kernel stable tree

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5fedf279a1ea369d39c8b06dd4547cdc576065d0
Web page

ceph: fix hanging __ceph_get_caps() with stale mds_wanted - kernel/git/stable/linux.git - Linux kernel stable tree

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5e84bc6f67e19fdd192d8b215de728acbfc12572
Web page

ceph: fix hanging __ceph_get_caps() with stale mds_wanted - kernel/git/stable/linux.git - Linux kernel stable tree

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/50958bb928bad3bdba9e5d1b7ff4bbadcf6951e6

Vendor Advisories for CVE-2026-80527(2)

These vendors published their own advisory mentioning this CVE — often with vendor-specific remediation steps + affected product lists not in NVD.

Patch Availability(1)

Vendor / EcosystemFix (by version range) / PatchReleasedSource
ubuntulinux-tools-nvidia-tegra-rt-6.8 (6.8.0-1036.39) @ noble2026-10-16ubuntu

Patches are aggregated from vendor advisories (Red Hat, Microsoft, Cisco, GitHub) and package ecosystems (OSV, GHSA). Multiple rows for the same upstream release have been deduplicated.

Affected Packages

(4 across 3 ecosystems)
Debian:12(2)
PackageVulnerable rangeFix by version rangeDependents
linux6.1.106-1 ... 6.1.99-1 (56 versions)
  • every version up to 6.1.187-1: fixed in 6.1.187-1
—
linux-6.126.12.100-1~deb12u1, 6.12.101-1~deb12u1
  • every version up to 6.12.107-1~deb12u1: fixed in 6.12.107-1~deb12u1
—
Debian:13(1)
PackageVulnerable rangeFix by version rangeDependents
linux6.12.100-1 ... 6.12.96-1 (33 versions)
  • every version up to 6.12.105-1: fixed in 6.12.105-1
—
Debian:14(1)
PackageVulnerable rangeFix by version rangeDependents
linux6.12.100-1 ... 7.1~rc7-1~exp1 (169 versions)
  • every version up to 7.1.10-1: fixed in 7.1.10-1
—

Additional Vendor Advisories

(1)

Vendors that published advisories for this CVE beyond the curated set above. Broader coverage but minimal per-row detail — click through for the original advisory.

Data Freshness Timeline

(refreshed 8× in last 7d / 83× in last 30d)

Each row is a time one of our pipelines fetched, updated or re-scored this CVE. For example, "NVD update" means NVD published or revised its analysis for this CVE; "MITRE cvelistV5" means we ingested or refreshed it from the CNA feed. An arrow marks a change the record states ("CVSS v3 → 9.1"); EPSS and GHSA rows show the values recorded at that time, not what changed (EPSS values are rounded; hover one for the exact figures). Most recent first.

Showing the most recent 100 of 234 refreshes on record for this CVE.

A repeat, a row identical to one the same pipeline wrote less than 10 seconds earlier, is not a separate refresh and is not counted. None are among the latest 100 rows. The 134 oldest rows on record are not shown and were not checked, so the counts can still include repeats.

  1. 2026-10-30 16:35 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.5% · 42nd percentile
  2. 2026-10-29 16:34 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.5% · 42nd percentile
  3. 2026-10-28 16:33 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.5% · 42nd percentile
  4. 2026-10-27 16:32 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.5% · 42nd percentile
  5. 2026-10-26 16:32 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.5% · 42nd percentile
  6. 2026-10-25 16:34 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.5% · 42nd percentile
  7. 2026-10-25 13:59 UTCEG score recompute
  8. 2026-10-24 16:33 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.5% · 42nd percentile
  9. 2026-10-24 06:25 UTCEG score recompute
  10. 2026-10-24 06:25 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-q6xj-rvvg-h9r2 · GitHub severity HIGH · GitHub CVSS 7.5
  11. 2026-10-23 16:32 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.5% · 42nd percentile
  12. 2026-10-22 16:35 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.5% · 42nd percentile
  13. 2026-10-21 16:33 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.5% · 41st percentile
  14. 2026-10-20 16:33 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.5% · 41st percentile
  15. 2026-10-19 16:33 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.5% · 41st percentile
  16. 2026-10-18 16:33 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.5% · 41st percentile
  17. 2026-10-18 03:10 UTCEG score recompute
  18. 2026-10-17 16:35 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.5% · 41st percentile
  19. 2026-10-16 20:32 UTCEG score recompute
  20. 2026-10-16 20:32 UTCVendor advisory
  21. 2026-10-16 20:32 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-q6xj-rvvg-h9r2 · GitHub severity HIGH · GitHub CVSS 7.5
  22. 2026-10-16 19:37 UTCEG score recompute
  23. 2026-10-16 19:37 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-q6xj-rvvg-h9r2 · GitHub severity HIGH · GitHub CVSS 7.5
  24. 2026-10-16 16:44 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.5% · 41st percentile
  25. 2026-10-15 16:33 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.5% · 41st percentile
Show 75 more
  1. 2026-10-14 16:33 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.5% · 41st percentile
  2. 2026-10-13 16:35 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.5% · 41st percentile
  3. 2026-10-13 06:29 UTCEG score recompute
  4. 2026-10-13 06:29 UTCVendor advisory
  5. 2026-10-13 06:29 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-q6xj-rvvg-h9r2 · GitHub severity HIGH · GitHub CVSS 7.5
  6. 2026-10-12 16:35 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.5% · 41st percentile
  7. 2026-10-12 14:57 UTCEG score recompute
  8. 2026-10-11 19:21 UTCEG score recompute
  9. 2026-10-11 16:37 UTCEG score recompute
  10. 2026-10-11 13:55 UTCEG score recompute
  11. 2026-10-11 13:49 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.5% · 41st percentile
  12. 2026-10-10 20:00 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.5% · 41st percentile
  13. 2026-10-10 06:33 UTCEG score recompute
  14. 2026-10-10 06:33 UTCVendor advisory
  15. 2026-10-10 06:33 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-q6xj-rvvg-h9r2 · GitHub severity HIGH · GitHub CVSS 7.5
  16. 2026-10-09 20:07 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.5% · 41st percentile
  17. 2026-10-09 03:25 UTCEG score recompute
  18. 2026-10-09 03:25 UTCVendor advisory
  19. 2026-10-09 03:25 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-q6xj-rvvg-h9r2 · GitHub severity HIGH · GitHub CVSS 7.5
  20. 2026-10-08 17:13 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.5% · 40th percentile
  21. 2026-10-08 01:54 UTCEG score recompute
  22. 2026-10-08 01:54 UTCVendor advisory
  23. 2026-10-08 01:54 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-q6xj-rvvg-h9r2 · GitHub severity HIGH · GitHub CVSS 7.5
  24. 2026-10-07 23:48 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.5% · 40th percentile
  25. 2026-10-07 07:38 UTCVendor advisory
  26. 2026-10-07 07:38 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-q6xj-rvvg-h9r2 · GitHub severity HIGH · GitHub CVSS 7.5
  27. 2026-10-06 19:40 UTCEG score recompute
  28. 2026-10-06 19:40 UTCVendor advisory
  29. 2026-10-06 19:40 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-q6xj-rvvg-h9r2 · GitHub severity HIGH · GitHub CVSS 7.5
  30. 2026-10-06 15:18 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.5% · 40th percentile
  31. 2026-10-06 07:36 UTCEG score recompute
  32. 2026-10-06 07:36 UTCVendor advisory
  33. 2026-10-06 07:36 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-q6xj-rvvg-h9r2 · GitHub severity HIGH · GitHub CVSS 7.5
  34. 2026-10-05 17:43 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.5% · 40th percentile
  35. 2026-10-05 16:55 UTCVendor advisory
  36. 2026-10-05 16:55 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-q6xj-rvvg-h9r2 · GitHub severity HIGH · GitHub CVSS 7.5
  37. 2026-10-05 04:38 UTCEG score recompute
  38. 2026-10-05 04:38 UTCVendor advisory
  39. 2026-10-05 04:38 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-q6xj-rvvg-h9r2 · GitHub severity HIGH · GitHub CVSS 7.5
  40. 2026-10-04 23:22 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.5% · 40th percentile
  41. 2026-10-04 16:02 UTCVendor advisory
  42. 2026-10-04 16:02 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-q6xj-rvvg-h9r2 · GitHub severity HIGH · GitHub CVSS 7.5
  43. 2026-10-04 04:05 UTCVendor advisory
  44. 2026-10-04 04:05 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-q6xj-rvvg-h9r2 · GitHub severity HIGH · GitHub CVSS 7.5
  45. 2026-10-03 16:08 UTCEG score recompute
  46. 2026-10-03 16:08 UTCVendor advisory
  47. 2026-10-03 16:08 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-q6xj-rvvg-h9r2 · GitHub severity HIGH · GitHub CVSS 7.5
  48. 2026-10-03 14:26 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.5% · 40th percentile
  49. 2026-10-02 19:55 UTCEG score recompute
  50. 2026-10-02 19:55 UTCVendor advisory
  51. 2026-10-02 19:55 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-q6xj-rvvg-h9r2 · GitHub severity HIGH · GitHub CVSS 7.5
  52. 2026-10-02 17:57 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.5% · 40th percentile
  53. 2026-10-02 07:58 UTCVendor advisory
  54. 2026-10-02 07:58 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-q6xj-rvvg-h9r2 · GitHub severity HIGH · GitHub CVSS 7.5
  55. 2026-10-01 19:57 UTCEG score recompute
  56. 2026-10-01 19:57 UTCVendor advisory
  57. 2026-10-01 19:57 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-q6xj-rvvg-h9r2 · GitHub severity HIGH · GitHub CVSS 7.5
  58. 2026-10-01 19:50 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.5% · 40th percentile
  59. 2026-10-01 07:56 UTCVendor advisory
  60. 2026-10-01 07:56 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-q6xj-rvvg-h9r2 · GitHub severity HIGH · GitHub CVSS 7.5
  61. 2026-09-30 19:59 UTCEG score recompute
  62. 2026-09-30 19:59 UTCVendor advisory
  63. 2026-09-30 19:59 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-q6xj-rvvg-h9r2 · GitHub severity HIGH · GitHub CVSS 7.5
  64. 2026-09-30 15:04 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.5% · 40th percentile
  65. 2026-09-30 06:07 UTCEG score recompute
  66. 2026-09-30 06:07 UTCVendor advisory
  67. 2026-09-30 06:07 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-q6xj-rvvg-h9r2 · GitHub severity HIGH · GitHub CVSS 7.5
  68. 2026-09-29 12:29 UTCEG score recompute
  69. 2026-09-29 12:29 UTCVendor advisory
  70. 2026-09-29 12:29 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-q6xj-rvvg-h9r2 · GitHub severity HIGH · GitHub CVSS 7.5
  71. 2026-09-28 21:21 UTCEG score recompute
  72. 2026-09-28 21:21 UTCVendor advisory
  73. 2026-09-28 21:21 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-q6xj-rvvg-h9r2 · GitHub severity HIGH · GitHub CVSS 7.5
  74. 2026-09-28 13:52 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.7% · 51st percentile
  75. 2026-09-28 08:50 UTCVendor advisory

Frequently asked(5)

What is CVE-2026-80527?
CVE-2026-80527 is a high-severity vulnerability; its CVE record was published on August 26, 2026. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: fix hanging cephgetcaps() with stale mds_wanted A reader can hang forever in cephgetcaps() when the client no longer holds FILE_RD, but local cap state still says that the capability is already wanted (via mds_wanted). One…
When was the CVE record for CVE-2026-80527 published?
The CVE record for CVE-2026-80527 was published on August 26, 2026. That is the record's publication date; the vulnerability itself may have been made public earlier. EchelonGraph's copy of the record carries a last-modified date of October 16, 2026; the record at its source may have been updated since.
Is CVE-2026-80527 actively exploited?
CVE-2026-80527 is not currently on CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. FIRST EPSS estimates a 0.5% probability of exploitation in the next 30 days (42nd percentile of EPSS-scored CVEs).
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-80527?
CVE-2026-80527 has a CVSS base score of 7.5 (a secondary CVSS source that NVD displays; NVD's own analysis pending).
How do I remediate CVE-2026-80527?
A fix for CVE-2026-80527 is available: update to the fixed version the vendor names in its advisory. The vendor advisories EchelonGraph has for CVE-2026-80527 are linked in the Vendor Advisories panel on this page.

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