In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
regulator: tps65219: fix irq_data.rdev not being assigned
Commit 64a6b577490c ("regulator: tps65219: Remove debugging helper
function") removed the tps65219_get_rdev_by_name() helper along with
the irq_data.rdev assignment that depended on it. This left
irq_data.rdev uninitialized for all IRQs, causing undefined behavior
when regulator_notifier_call_chain() is called from the IRQ handler:
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004
pc : regulator_notifier_call_chain
lr : tps65219_regulator_irq_handler
Call trace:
regulator_notifier_call_chain
tps65219_regulator_irq_handler
handle_nested_irq
regmap_irq_thread
irq_thread_fn
irq_thread
kthread
ret_from_fork
Instead of restoring a dedicated lookup array, restructure the probe
function to combine regulator registration with IRQ registration in
the same loop. This way the rdev returned by devm_regulator_register()
is naturally available for assigning to irq_data.rdev without any
auxiliary data structure.
Non-regulator IRQs (SENSOR, TIMEOUT) that don't correspond to any
registered regulator are registered with rdev=NULL, and the IRQ handler
is protected with a NULL check to avoid crashing.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it