In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: bridge: make ebt_snat ARP rewrite writable
The ebtables SNAT target keeps the Ethernet source address rewrite
behind skb_ensure_writable(skb, 0). This is intentional: at the bridge
ebtables hooks the Ethernet header is addressed through
skb_mac_header()/eth_hdr(), while skb->data points at the Ethernet
payload. Asking skb_ensure_writable() for ETH_HLEN bytes would check
the payload, not the Ethernet header, and would reintroduce the small
packet regression fixed by commit 63137bc5882a.
However, the optional ARP sender hardware address rewrite is different.
It writes through skb_store_bits() at an offset relative to skb->data:
skb_store_bits(skb, sizeof(struct arphdr), info->mac, ETH_ALEN)
skb_header_pointer() only safely reads the ARP header; it does not make
the later sender hardware address range writable. If that range is
still held in a nonlinear skb fragment backed by a splice-imported file
page, skb_store_bits() maps the frag page and copies the new MAC address
directly into it.
Ensure the ARP SHA range is writable before reading the ARP header and
before calling skb_store_bits().
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low, Attend at medium and Act at high mission impact.
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines at low, sooner than that at medium and as soon as possible at high mission impact.
Exploitation active (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)3 days & forensic triage if the affected system is publicly exposed; 14 days if it is not.
In CISA KEV yes (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it
CISA required action“Apply mitigations in accordance with vendor instructions, ensuring compliance with CISA’s BOD 26-04 Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (see URL in Notes) guidance and CISA’s “Forensics Triage Requirements” (see URL in Notes). Follow applicable BOD 26-04 guidance for cloud services or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. Stakeholders are responsible for evaluating each asset's internet exposure and ensuring adherence to BOD 26-04 patching guidelines.”
Quoted verbatim from CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. CISA directs it at US federal civilian executive branch agencies under Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 26-04, which replaced BOD 22-01 on 10 June 2026; it is not EchelonGraph's advice. CISA's notes: https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf84ad7c7a9ede46e31afaa41a1ba06a159e8c87 · https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/76280b78cc9f23bdc6438e10ad6dff148ef8375b · https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b7e91939ba9be805a62a257fa4e227dffbb88fa0 · https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/afd64b59c3de9bbbdd3759e834fdc55cda716e0b · https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/153ea96c806aea395daba907a4f88480b6ad5093 · https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b18675263db1147c8e1cab625400c13a0d87bd2d · https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c9b5ff59feffb92a147a84a5aa28acd2cb8ff4c5 · https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/67ba971ae02514d85818fe0c32549ab4bfa3bf49 · https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk · https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk