In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: validate cached peer INIT chunk length in COOKIE_ECHO processing
When a listening SCTP server processes a COOKIE_ECHO chunk, the cached peer INIT chunk embedded after the cookie is parsed and its parameters are later walked by sctp_process_init() using sctp_walk_params().
However, the chunk header length of this cached INIT chunk was not validated against the remaining buffer in the COOKIE_ECHO payload. If the length field is inflated, the parameter walk can run beyond the actual received data, leading to out-of-bounds reads and potential memory corruption during later parameter handling (e.g. STATE_COOKIE processing and kmemdup() copies).
Add a bounds check in sctp_unpack_cookie() to ensure the cached INIT chunk length does not exceed the available data in the COOKIE_ECHO buffer before it is used.