EchelonGraph verdictMonitorNo release containing the referenced fix is confirmed: check the referenced fix and the vendor's advisory for a release that contains it; until one is applied, restrict network exposure of the affected system or apply the vendor's mitigation on your normal schedule (the SSVC decision on this page).
- •Lower severity and no public exploit yet
CISA-KEV: Not listedEPSS PROB: 0.1%CVSS: 3.7Exploit: None knownExposed services: Not assessed
A fix is referenced (a reference tagged "Patch", often a source commit), but no release containing it is confirmed — find the release that contains it; until it is applied, mitigate (WAF / firewall / segmentation).
MISP, a threat intelligence sharing platform, contains a vulnerability in its cryptographic key management for protected (PGP-signed) events. Two related defects allow a revoked PGP key to remain effective for signing and validating protected events.
First, the validateProtectedEvent() method in the CryptographicKey model iterates over the event's stored cryptographic keys to verify a PGP signature but does not check the revoked flag on each key. A key explicitly marked as revoked is still used to validate signatures, meaning an entity whose key has been revoked can continue to sign protected events and have them accepted by the MISP instance.
Second, the captureCryptographicKeyUpdate() method, responsible for synchronizing the key list when a sync user edits a protected event, contained a query bug (find('first') instead of find('all')) that caused only the first stored key to be considered. As a result, revocations of additional keys were never persisted, keys absent from the pushed list were not removed, and entries lacking an explicit fingerprint were mismatched and incorrectly deleted. Additionally, the revocation logic did not enforce the invariant that a revocation, once stored, is never lifted by subsequent pushes.
A third minor issue: a signed protected event submitted without any cryptographic keys triggered an unhandled 500 error rather than a proper rejection response.
Preconditions: the attacker must be an authenticated sync user with permission to add or edit protected events on the MISP instance. The impact is that revoked keys retain signing authority, key revocations propagated by sync partners are silently dropped, and the integrity of the protected-event trust chain is compromised. In a multi-instance MISP deployment, events signed by revoked keys can propagate to other instances, extending the integrity impact across the sync network.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (3.7): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 3.7 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 3.7 LOWCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.1% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS. FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.No released fix is confirmed on this page, but CISA's timeline does not wait for a fix's release: it starts when an agency identifies the flaw on an asset and updates the CDM Agency and Federal Dashboard, and the directive counts patching, decommissioning the system or another action as remediation. Until a fixed release is applied, mitigate as this page's verdict says. In the directive's words, “Fix on system upgrade” means that, “unless conditions change”, the vulnerability “should be remediated the next time the vulnerable asset receives a scheduled major upgrade or rebuild”: its timelines are “dynamic as facts change”, and a KEV listing shortens them.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
A fix is referenced, but no release containing it is confirmed. Check the referenced fix and the vendor's advisory for a release that contains it; until one is applied, restrict network exposure of the affected system or apply the vendor's mitigation on your normal schedule.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
No released fix is confirmed on this page, but CISA's timeline does not wait for a fix's release: it starts when an agency identifies the flaw on an asset and updates the CDM Agency and Federal Dashboard, and the directive counts patching, decommissioning the system or another action as remediation. Until a fixed release is applied, mitigate as this page's verdict says. In the directive's words, “Fix on system upgrade” means that, “unless conditions change”, the vulnerability “should be remediated the next time the vulnerable asset receives a scheduled major upgrade or rebuild”: its timelines are “dynamic as facts change”, and a KEV listing shortens them.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it