MISP contains a vulnerability in the cryptographic signature verification of protected events. When a MISP instance signs a protected event for synchronization, it strips all whitespace from the JSON body before computing the PGP signature (preg_replace("/\s+/", "", $data)). The receiving instance performs the same whitespace-stripping before verification. Because the signature covers only the whitespace-free representation, a network relay positioned between two MISP instances can insert whitespace characters into JSON object keys (effectively renaming fields) or into identifier values such as UUIDs, timestamps, and distribution fields without invalidating the signature. The receiving instance accepts the modified event as authentic.
The vulnerability affects the protected event synchronization path: event creation (EventsController::add), event editing (EventsController::edit), event viewing (EventsController::view1), and server-to-server pull synchronization (ServerSyncTool, Server model). An attacker with a network position to intercept and modify traffic between MISP instances can alter the semantic content of protected events while the PGP signature still validates, undermining the integrity guarantees that protected events are designed to provide.
The fix introduces two complementary mechanisms. First, a post-verification scan rejects any received body that contains whitespace in JSON keys (except under Galaxy cluster 'meta' keys) or in identifier-like values (uuid, id, timestamp, distribution, date). Second, a new exact-byte signature scheme (x-pgp-signature-v2) signs the body as transmitted, without whitespace normalization. MISP 3.0 and later peers exchange this exact-byte signature; older peers retain the legacy whitespace-stripped signature. A signature_version field is embedded in protected events so that a 3.0 receiver refuses a body carrying that marker if only the legacy signature is present. Both mechanisms together close the whitespace-injection vector while preserving backward compatibility with pre-3.0 instances.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (6.9): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 6.9 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 6.9 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.a secondary CVSS source
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS. FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Attend at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; 60 days if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Attend at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines at low or medium mission impact and sooner than that at high.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable yes (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; 60 days if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable yes (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it