CVE-2026-112377

HIGHPre-NVD 7.47.4
EchelonGraph scoreHIGH confidence

“—” beside the score: it is equal to the CVSS score beside it.

Score 7.4 from GitHub Security Advisory (severity: CRITICAL) published 2026-10-19. A secondary CVSS source baseline 7.4; sources differ by 0.0.

Triggered by: GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
Sources: EPSS, GitHub Security Advisory, a secondary CVSS source
Trending — 4 sources updated this week
7.4EG
EchelonGraph verdictPlan mitigationRemediate within your standard update timelines (the SSVC decision on this page).
  • High severity, but no confirmed exploitation yet
CISA-KEV: Not listedEPSS PROB: 0.2%CVSS: 7.4Exploit: None knownExposed services: Not assessed

An upstream fix is merged but not yet released — mitigate (WAF / firewall / segmentation) until the release ships, then apply it.

CCC Attestation SIG attested-tls-poc through commit 731ca82 fails to bind early attestation Evidence to the TLS connection, allowing attackers to relay valid Evidence from a genuine attester. Attackers holding an extracted attested TLS private key can forward the relying party's nonce to a genuine attester and replay its Evidence to impersonate the attested workload and intercept data.

CVSS v3
7.4
EG Score
7.4HIGHhigh confidence
EG Risk
33
EG Risk 33/100

EG Risk is EchelonGraph's 0–100 priority score. It fuses impact severity (EG Severity, the CVSS base score, never the KEV-floored or EPSS-lifted EG Score) with real-world exploitation and automatability, under weights EchelonGraph set by hand, so you can rank equal-severity CVEs and fix the most dangerous first. Higher = act sooner.

How it’s computed (value × EchelonGraph’s weight)
Severity74% × 45%
Impact severity (EG Severity): CVSS 7.4 of 10. Never the KEV-floored or EPSS-lifted EG Score.
Exploitation0.2% × 40%
FIRST EPSS: the 30-day exploitation probability when EchelonGraph scored this CVE.
Automatability0% × 15%
CISA's SSVC Automatable value: no (Vulnrichment).
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph): Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE.
Action: An upstream fix is merged but not yet in a tagged release. Restrict network exposure of the affected system or apply the vendor's mitigation within your standard update timelines until it ships, then apply the release.
EPSS PROB
0.2%
EPSS %ILE
7th
KEV
Not listed

What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)

The EG score (7.4): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 7.4 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.

EG Severity
7.4 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
EG Likelihood
0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-20). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
Confirmed exploitation
None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
EG Priority
SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.

SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).

An upstream fix is merged but not yet in a tagged release. Restrict network exposure of the affected system or apply the vendor's mitigation within your standard update timelines until it ships, then apply the release.

Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table

BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.

In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it

Published

October 19, 2026

Last Modified

October 20, 2026

Advisory Details (7)

Auto-updated Oct 19, 2026
🔬 Proof of concept available. Upstream fix merged — awaiting tagged release. Sources: github_pr.
Web page

CCC Attestation SIG attested-tls-poc through commit 731ca82 Attestation Relay Attack | Advisories | VulnCheck

https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/ccc-attestation-sig-attested-tls-poc-through-commit-731ca82-attestation-relay-attack
Web page🟡 PoC Available

GitHub - CCC-Attestation/attested-tls-poc: Miscellaneous materials related to the "attested TLS" proof-of-concept · GitHub

https://github.com/CCC-Attestation/attested-tls-poc
Web page

GitHub - muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake.fail: Proof of insecurity of intra-handshake attestation · GitHub

https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake.fail
Web page🟡 PoC Available

draft-intra-handshake-fail-55 - Early Attestation Considered Very Harmful (CVE-2026-100835 of CVSS 9.1, CVE-2026-92701 of CVSS 9.1, CVE-2026-92702 of CVSS 9.1, CVE-2026-100833 of CVSS 8.2, CVE-2026-33697 of CVSS 7.5, and 36 other CVEs of up to expected CVSS 10.0 upcoming)

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-intra-handshake-fail/
Web page

mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c at f4ac7593826a506fc509c83cad73786acab1d442 · ionut-arm/mbedtls · GitHub

https://github.com/ionut-arm/mbedtls/blob/f4ac7593826a506fc509c83cad73786acab1d442/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c#L430-L436
Web page🟡 PoC Available

attested-tls-poc/relay-attacks-formal at 5b6c5374b3fe8b671906c8ab32f6134d9c3da26d · CCC-Attestation/attested-tls-poc · GitHub

https://github.com/CCC-Attestation/attested-tls-poc/tree/5b6c5374b3fe8b671906c8ab32f6134d9c3da26d/relay-attacks-formal
GitHub pull request

Add proof of relay attacks

Fix merged in CCC-Attestation/attested-tls-poc PR #58 on 2026-07-17 — awaiting tagged release

https://github.com/CCC-Attestation/attested-tls-poc/pull/58

Vendor Advisories for CVE-2026-112377(1)

These vendors published their own advisory mentioning this CVE — often with vendor-specific remediation steps + affected product lists not in NVD.

Weakness Classification(1)

MITRE Common Weakness Enumeration — the root-cause categories this CVE belongs to.

Data Freshness Timeline

(refreshed 11× in last 7d / 11× in last 30d)

Each row is a time one of our pipelines fetched, updated or re-scored this CVE. For example, "NVD update" means NVD published or revised its analysis for this CVE; "MITRE cvelistV5" means we ingested or refreshed it from the CNA feed. An arrow marks a change the record states ("CVSS v3 → 9.1"); EPSS and GHSA rows show the values recorded at that time, not what changed (EPSS values are rounded; hover one for the exact figures). Most recent first.

  1. 2026-10-21 16:32 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.2% · 7th percentile
  2. 2026-10-20 18:27 UTCEG score recompute
  3. 2026-10-20 18:27 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-hqrh-qq2r-6h96 · GitHub severity CRITICAL · GitHub CVSS 7.4
  4. 2026-10-20 17:48 UTCEG score recompute
  5. 2026-10-20 17:48 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-hqrh-qq2r-6h96 · GitHub severity CRITICAL · GitHub CVSS 7.4
  6. 2026-10-20 16:32 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.2% · 6th percentile
  7. 2026-10-19 21:36 UTCEG score recompute
  8. 2026-10-19 21:36 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-hqrh-qq2r-6h96 · GitHub severity CRITICAL · GitHub CVSS 7.4
  9. 2026-10-19 18:26 UTCEG score recompute
  10. 2026-10-19 17:38 UTCEG score recomputeFirst assessed: 7.4 HIGH
  11. 2026-10-19 17:37 UTCMITRE cvelistV5first tracked

Frequently asked(5)

What is CVE-2026-112377?
CVE-2026-112377 is a high-severity vulnerability; its CVE record was published on October 19, 2026. CCC Attestation SIG attested-tls-poc through commit 731ca82 fails to bind early attestation Evidence to the TLS connection, allowing attackers to relay valid Evidence from a genuine attester. Attackers holding an extracted attested TLS private key can forward the relying party's nonce to a genuine…
When was CVE-2026-112377 made public?
CVE-2026-112377 was made public on July 17, 2026: that is the date its CVE record's CNA, VulnCheck, gives for when the vulnerability was made public. The CVE record itself was published on October 19, 2026. EchelonGraph's copy of the record carries a last-modified date of October 20, 2026; the record at its source may have been updated since.
Is CVE-2026-112377 actively exploited?
CVE-2026-112377 is not currently on CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. FIRST EPSS estimates a 0.2% probability of exploitation in the next 30 days (7th percentile of EPSS-scored CVEs).
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-112377?
CVE-2026-112377 has a CVSS base score of 7.4 (a secondary CVSS source that NVD displays; NVD's own analysis pending).
How do I remediate CVE-2026-112377?
An upstream fix for CVE-2026-112377 has been merged but is not yet in a tagged release. Until it ships, restrict network exposure of the affected system or apply the vendor's mitigation, then update to the release that contains the fix. The vendor advisories EchelonGraph has for CVE-2026-112377 are linked in the Vendor Advisories panel on this page.

Dependency Blast Radius

Explore the affected products and dependency analysis for CVE-2026-112377

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