In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Fix unsafe xarray access in implicit ODP handling
__xa_store() and __xa_erase() were used without holding the proper lock,
which led to a lockdep warning due to unsafe RCU usage. This patch
replaces them with xa_store() and xa_erase(), which perform the necessary
locking internally.
=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCPU usage
6.14.0-rc7_for_upstream_debug_2025_03_18_15_01 #1 Not tainted
-----------------------------
./include/linux/xarray.h:1211 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
3 locks held by kworker/u136:0/219:
at: process_one_work+0xbe4/0x15f0
process_one_work+0x75c/0x15f0
pagefault_mr+0x9a5/0x1390 [mlx5_ib]
stack backtrace:
CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 219 Comm: kworker/u136:0 Not tainted
6.14.0-rc7_for_upstream_debug_2025_03_18_15_01 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS
rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: mlx5_ib_page_fault mlx5_ib_eqe_pf_action [mlx5_ib]
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0xa8/0xc0
lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x1e6/0x260
xas_create+0xb8a/0xee0
xas_store+0x73/0x14c0
__xa_store+0x13c/0x220
? xa_store_range+0x390/0x390
? spin_bug+0x1d0/0x1d0
pagefault_mr+0xcb5/0x1390 [mlx5_ib]
? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1f/0x30
mlx5_ib_eqe_pf_action+0x3be/0x2620 [mlx5_ib]
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400
? mlx5_ib_invalidate_range+0xcb0/0xcb0 [mlx5_ib]
process_one_work+0x7db/0x15f0
? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0xda0/0xda0
? assign_work+0x168/0x240
worker_thread+0x57d/0xcd0
? rescuer_thread+0xc40/0xc40
kthread+0x3b3/0x800
? kthread_is_per_cpu+0xb0/0xb0
? lock_downgrade+0x680/0x680
? do_raw_spin_lock+0x12d/0x270
? spin_bug+0x1d0/0x1d0
? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x284/0x9e0
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x284/0x400
? kthread_is_per_cpu+0xb0/0xb0
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70
? kthread_is_per_cpu+0xb0/0xb0
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-29). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it