In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xsk: Fix xsk_diag use-after-free error during socket cleanup
Fix a use-after-free error that is possible if the xsk_diag interface
is used after the socket has been unbound from the device. This can
happen either due to the socket being closed or the device
disappearing. In the early days of AF_XDP, the way we tested that a
socket was not bound to a device was to simply check if the netdevice
pointer in the xsk socket structure was NULL. Later, a better system
was introduced by having an explicit state variable in the xsk socket
struct. For example, the state of a socket that is on the way to being
closed and has been unbound from the device is XSK_UNBOUND.
The commit in the Fixes tag below deleted the old way of signalling
that a socket is unbound, setting dev to NULL. This in the belief that
all code using the old way had been exterminated. That was
unfortunately not true as the xsk diagnostics code was still using the
old way and thus does not work as intended when a socket is going
down. Fix this by introducing a test against the state variable. If
the socket is in the state XSK_UNBOUND, simply abort the diagnostic's
netlink operation.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it