Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Hardened Images RPMs Security Update
🔗 CVE IDs covered (1)
📋 Description
CVE-2026-77299 — github.com/dlclark/regexp2: regexp2: Denial of Service via unbounded memory allocation during pattern matching
🎯 Affected products8
- Red Hat Hardened Images
- loki3.6-0:3.6.20-0.2.hum1@aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
- loki3.6-0:3.6.20-0.2.hum1@src as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
- loki3.6-0:3.6.20-0.2.hum1@x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
- loki3.6-canary-0:3.6.20-0.2.hum1@aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
- loki3.6-canary-0:3.6.20-0.2.hum1@x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
- loki3.6-logcli-0:3.6.20-0.2.hum1@aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
- loki3.6-logcli-0:3.6.20-0.2.hum1@x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
✅ Remediation
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://images.redhat.com/ Workaround: Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability. --- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-11-06) --- Disclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from https://cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure. The highest-value action is to enforce computational budget and backtracking depth limits within regexp2 or disallow untrusted user-supplied patterns: upgrade to regexp2 2.3.0 (or the corresponding fixed Red Hat builds), which enforce a default limit of 100,000 slots on the backtracking stack via OptionMaxBacktrackingStackSize and optimize away repeated literal empty expressions, closing crafted regular expression with large repetition quantifier on empty subexpression. Until patched, this is only a concern on Go applications compiling or matching untrusted, user-supplied regular expressions using regexp2 — deployments restricting pattern definitions to trusted administrative inputs are unaffected — so validate incoming patterns to reject large quantifier values and zero-width repetitions, and restrict regular expression compilation exclusively to trusted administrative inputs. As a compensating measure, enforce per-process address space limits (RLIMIT_AS) via ulimit or prlimit to constrain memory consumed by the backtracking stack, reject regular expression inputs containing repetition quantifiers that exceed safe application-defined bounds before passing them to regexp2, and apply cgroups v2 resource limits to bound container memory usage and prevent host-wide memory starvation. These controls limit blast radius and contain exploitation, but they do not fix the underlying unbounded memory allocation defect — apply the upstream patch to fully remediate. Highest-impact CME: CME-1316 Algorithmic Complexity Safeguards (Pattern/Regex Execution Limits) (high)
🔗 References (5)
- selfhttps://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:98019
- externalhttps://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-77299
- externalhttps://access.redhat.com/security/updates/classification/
- externalhttps://images.redhat.com/
- selfhttps://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/advisories/2026/rhsa-2026_98019.json