RHSA-2026:54071HighCVSS 8.6

Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Hardened Images RPMs Security Update

Published
August 12, 2026
Last Modified
October 16, 2026

🔗 CVE IDs covered (8)

CVE-2026-12617 →CVE-2026-13204 →CVE-2026-13321 →CVE-2026-10723 →CVE-2026-10822 →CVE-2026-11331 →CVE-2026-11622 →CVE-2026-11721 →

📋 Description

CVE-2026-10723 — bind: bind9: Incorrect acceptance of NSEC3 records CVE-2026-10822 — bind: bind9: Key Record using PRIVATEDNS algorithm may lead to exit CVE-2026-11331 — bind: bind: Denial of Service via long query names in RPZ processing CVE-2026-11622 — bind: bind9: Potential memory usage beyond configured limits CVE-2026-11721 — bind: bind9: Cache poisoning via label count discrepancy, RRSIG, wildcards CVE-2026-12617 — bind: bind9: Record ordering based unexpected exit with CNAME or DNAME CVE-2026-13204 — bind: bind9: Unexpected exit with NSEC and NSEC3 both present CVE-2026-13321 — bind: bind9: DNSSEC Validation Bypass via Out-of-Zone NSEC Next Field

🎯 Affected products16

  • Red Hat Hardened Images
  • bind-0:9.20.26-0.1.hum1@aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
  • bind-0:9.20.26-0.1.hum1@src as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
  • bind-0:9.20.26-0.1.hum1@x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
  • bind-chroot-0:9.20.26-0.1.hum1@aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
  • bind-chroot-0:9.20.26-0.1.hum1@x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
  • bind-devel-0:9.20.26-0.1.hum1@aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
  • bind-devel-0:9.20.26-0.1.hum1@x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
  • bind-dnssec-utils-0:9.20.26-0.1.hum1@aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
  • bind-dnssec-utils-0:9.20.26-0.1.hum1@x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
  • bind-doc-0:9.20.26-0.1.hum1@noarch@public-hummingbird-aarch64-rpms as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
  • bind-doc-0:9.20.26-0.1.hum1@noarch@public-hummingbird-x86_64-rpms as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
  • bind-libs-0:9.20.26-0.1.hum1@aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
  • bind-libs-0:9.20.26-0.1.hum1@x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
  • bind-utils-0:9.20.26-0.1.hum1@aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
  • bind-utils-0:9.20.26-0.1.hum1@x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images

✅ Remediation

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://images.redhat.com/ Workaround: Upgrade to the patched release most closely related to your current version of BIND 9: - 9.20.26 - 9.21.24 BIND Supported Preview Edition is a special feature preview branch of BIND provided to eligible ISC support customers. - 9.20.26-S1 Workaround: To mitigate this issue, restrict resolver access to trusted networks and avoid using wildcard CNAME entries within Response Policy Zones (RPZ). 1. Edit `/etc/named.conf` to limit recursion and query caching to authorized client networks: ``` acl trusted_clients { 127.0.0.1; 192.168.1.0/24; }; options { allow-recursion { trusted_clients; }; allow-query-cache { trusted_clients; }; }; ``` Additionally, modify RPZ zone files to remove wildcard CNAME statements (such as `*.example.com CNAME target.com`), replacing them with explicit individual domain entries where feasible. 2. Reload the named service configuration: `systemctl reload named` Caveats: Restricting query access prevents untrusted external clients from resolving names through the server. Removing wildcard entries means unlisted subdomains will no longer be intercepted by the policy zone until explicit records are added. Warning: Reloading or restarting the named daemon may briefly disrupt ongoing DNS resolution. Workaround: Disclaimer: The following mitigation notes are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure. ISC states no workarounds exist. Until patched, restrict the resolver to authorized client networks and deploy separate resolvers per trust zone. Memory hardening and auth controls don't apply — this is a DNS protocol logic error using validly-signed records.

🔗 References (12)