RHSA-2026:24502HighCVSS 7.5

Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat build of Quarkus 3.33.2 release and security update

Published
June 10, 2026
Last Modified
August 21, 2026

🔗 CVE IDs covered (5)

CVE-2026-42584 →CVE-2026-42587 →CVE-2026-42578 →CVE-2026-42579 →CVE-2026-42581 →

📋 Description

CVE-2026-42578 — netty: io.netty/netty-handler-proxy: Netty: HTTP Header Injection via HttpProxyHandler Disabled Validation CVE-2026-42579 — netty: Netty: High integrity impact due to improper DNS domain name constraint enforcement CVE-2026-42581 — netty: io.netty/netty-codec-http: Netty: HTTP Request Smuggling due to improper handling of conflicting HTTP/1.0 headers CVE-2026-42584 — netty: io.netty/netty-codec-http: Netty: Incorrect HTTP response parsing leads to data confusion CVE-2026-42587 — netty: io.netty/netty-codec-http: io.netty/netty-codec-http2: Netty: Denial of Service via unbounded memory allocation in HTTP content decompression

🎯 Affected products1

  • Red Hat build of Quarkus 3.33.2

✅ Remediation

Before applying this update, make sure all previously released errata relevant to your system have been applied. For details on how to apply this update, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 Workaround: Applications utilizing Netty's HttpProxyHandler must ensure that any user-controlled input used to populate outbound headers is rigorously sanitized to prevent CRLF injection. If comprehensive input sanitization cannot be implemented, restricting network access to the application that uses the HttpProxyHandler can reduce the attack surface. Workaround: Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability. Workaround: To mitigate this issue, configure any reverse proxies or load balancers in front of Netty to either reject HTTP/1.0 requests containing both Transfer-Encoding: chunked and Content-Length headers, or to explicitly prioritize the Transfer-Encoding header over Content-Length for HTTP/1.0 traffic. This ensures consistent interpretation of message boundaries and prevents request smuggling attacks.

🔗 References (82)