Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Openshift Mirror Registry v2.0.13
🔗 CVE IDs covered (5)
📋 Description
CVE-2026-33818 — encoding/asn1: golang: Go encoding/asn1: Denial of Service via excessive recursion in Unmarshal CVE-2026-56860 — net/url: golang: golang net/url: Denial of Service from quadratic complexity in path resolution CVE-2026-56862 — crypto/tls: golang: Golang crypto/tls: Denial of Service via indefinite KeyUpdate messages CVE-2026-110697 — quay: quay: SQL LIKE wildcard injection in robot listing leaks cross-tenant robot tokens CVE-2026-123710 — quay: Red Hat Quay: unauthenticated registry signing-key takeover via service key rotation
🎯 Affected products4
- mirror registry for Red Hat OpenShift 2.0
- registry.redhat.io/openshift/mirror-registry-rhel8@sha256:93dca454ebc5be87c8b52267e6f06a3ac363fb103ba22bd661b877247162081f_amd64 as a component of mirror registry for Red Hat OpenShift 2.0
- registry.redhat.io/openshift/mirror-registry-rhel8@sha256:e85ab012cd46cfb26001fd847b107b60e4ca62cad2b09d456056b06dfda85cab_s390x as a component of mirror registry for Red Hat OpenShift 2.0
- registry.redhat.io/openshift/mirror-registry-rhel8@sha256:f07e18e0a2d171f62ba9dd8473c77cd078304d74b7254ac3c54fe155694ec2ee_ppc64le as a component of mirror registry for Red Hat OpenShift 2.0
✅ Remediation
Before applying this update, make sure all previously released errata relevant to your system have been applied. For details on how to apply this update, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 Workaround: Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability. Workaround: Update to the fixed Red Hat Quay release for your version: 3.9.28, 3.10.28, 3.12.24, 3.14.10, 3.15.9, 3.16.7, 3.17.7, or 3.18.3. Red Hat has already fixed Quay.io. There is no other complete workaround. If you cannot update immediately, restrict who can create organizations or namespaces containing an underscore, rotate robot tokens for any namespace that collides with an underscore-containing one, and monitor registry activity for pulls or pushes that don't match expected robot usage. These steps reduce exposure but do not fix the underlying flaw. Workaround: Restrict access to the /keys endpoint at the proxy or load balancer so only trusted internal components can reach it. Review audit logs for service_key_rotate and service_key_delete events with a null expiration_date, and remove any unrecognised approved service keys. Deleting a rogue key is not durable until a fixed build is deployed, because the anonymous request can install a new key.
🔗 References (8)
- selfhttps://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:100818
- externalhttps://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-110697
- externalhttps://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-123710
- externalhttps://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-33818
- externalhttps://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-56860
- externalhttps://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-56862
- externalhttps://access.redhat.com/security/updates/classification/
- selfhttps://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/advisories/2026/rhsa-2026_100818.json