RHSA-2022:5458HighCVSS 8.8

Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 6.4.24 security update

Published
June 30, 2022
Last Modified
August 4, 2026

🔗 CVE IDs covered (6)

CVE-2022-23302 →CVE-2022-23305 →CVE-2022-23307 →CVE-2020-13935 →CVE-2020-14384 →CVE-2021-4104 →

📋 Description

CVE-2020-13935 — tomcat: multiple requests with invalid payload length in a WebSocket frame could lead to DoS CVE-2020-14384 — jbossweb: Incomplete fix of CVE-2020-13935 for WebSocket in JBossWeb could lead to DoS CVE-2021-4104 — log4j: Remote code execution in Log4j 1.x when application is configured to use JMSAppender CVE-2022-23302 — log4j: Remote code execution in Log4j 1.x when application is configured to use JMSSink CVE-2022-23305 — log4j: SQL injection in Log4j 1.x when application is configured to use JDBCAppender CVE-2022-23307 — log4j: Unsafe deserialization flaw in Chainsaw log viewer

🎯 Affected products1

  • EAP 6.4.24 release

✅ Remediation

Before applying this update, back up your existing Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform installation and deployed applications. The References section of this erratum contains a download link (you must log in to download the update). Workaround: Red Hat has investigated whether a possible mitigation exists for this issue, and has not been able to identify a practical example. Please update as soon as possible. Workaround: These are the possible mitigations for this flaw for releases version 1.x: - Comment out or remove JMSAppender in the Log4j configuration if it is used - Remove the JMSAppender class from the classpath. For example: ``` zip -q -d log4j-*.jar org/apache/log4j/net/JMSAppender.class ``` - Restrict access for the OS user on the platform running the application to prevent modifying the Log4j configuration by the attacker. Workaround: These are the possible mitigations for this flaw for releases version 1.x: - Comment out or remove JMSSink in the Log4j configuration if it is used - Remove the JMSSink class from the server's jar files. For example: ``` zip -q -d log4j-*.jar org/apache/log4j/net/JMSSink.class ``` - Restrict access for the OS user on the platform running the application to prevent modifying the Log4j configuration by the attacker. Workaround: These are the possible mitigations for this flaw for releases version 1.x: - Comment out or remove JDBCAppender in the Log4j configuration if it is used - Remove the JDBCAppender class from the server's jar files. For example: ``` zip -q -d log4j-*.jar org/apache/log4j/jdbc/JDBCAppender.class ``` Workaround: These are the mitigations available for this flaw for log4j 1.x: - Avoid using Chainsaw to view logs, and instead use some other utility, especially if there is a log view available within the product itself. - Remove the Chainsaw classes from the log4j jar files. For example: ``` zip -q -d log4j-*.jar org/apache/log4j/chainsaw/* ``` (log4j jars may be nested in zip archives within product)

🔗 References (13)