Red Hat Security Advisory: OpenShift Container Platform 4.7.40 security update
🔗 CVE IDs covered (3)
📋 Description
CVE-2021-4104 — log4j: Remote code execution in Log4j 1.x when application is configured to use JMSAppender CVE-2021-44228 — log4j-core: Remote code execution in Log4j 2.x when logs contain an attacker-controlled string value CVE-2021-45046 — log4j-core: DoS in log4j 2.x with thread context message pattern and context lookup pattern (incomplete fix for CVE-2021-44228)
🎯 Affected products6
- Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.7
- openshift4/ose-metering-ansible-operator-bundle@sha256:665d34bc3e69cda3c37699051cfee983cf14f6d5f67d56d949652230937dcc90_amd64 as a component of Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.7
- openshift4/ose-metering-ansible-operator@sha256:5a2aa59c1c7a1423ec5fa39eabfc0dfa41cea0db82c9fc1f5c2ce9923ee792f4_amd64 as a component of Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.7
- openshift4/ose-metering-hadoop@sha256:03a4dd392453720b3950efa522682f5d07938c4d36e4269658c5a555afa403e7_amd64 as a component of Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.7
- openshift4/ose-metering-hive@sha256:3ae0917ca765603722b54a392bc5f1edc6c41b6c7d4c5eca95ed99c1d8af3d1c_amd64 as a component of Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.7
- openshift4/ose-metering-presto@sha256:795baa6f38910a8c35d179b8449cd8df3ad7644b9a0a13dad8407519902037e9_amd64 as a component of Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.7
✅ Remediation
For OpenShift Container Platform 4.7 see the following documentation, which will be updated shortly for this release, for important instructions on how to upgrade your cluster and fully apply this asynchronous errata update: https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.7/release_notes/ocp-4-7-release-notes.html Details on how to access this content are available at https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.7/updating/updating-cluster-cli.html Workaround: These are the possible mitigations for this flaw for releases version 1.x: - Comment out or remove JMSAppender in the Log4j configuration if it is used - Remove the JMSAppender class from the classpath. For example: ``` zip -q -d log4j-*.jar org/apache/log4j/net/JMSAppender.class ``` - Restrict access for the OS user on the platform running the application to prevent modifying the Log4j configuration by the attacker. Workaround: For Log4j versions >=2.10 set the system property log4j2.formatMsgNoLookups or the environment variable LOG4J_FORMAT_MSG_NO_LOOKUPS to true For Log4j versions >=2.7 and <=2.14.1 all PatternLayout patterns can be modified to specify the message converter as %m{nolookups} instead of just %m For Log4j versions >=2.0-beta9 and <=2.10.0 remove the JndiLookup class from the classpath. For example: ``` zip -q -d log4j-core-*.jar org/apache/logging/log4j/core/lookup/JndiLookup.class ``` On OpenShift 4 and in OpenShift Logging, the above mitigation can be applied by following the steps in this article: https://access.redhat.com/solutions/6578421 On OpenShift 3.11, mitigation to the affected Elasticsearch component can be applied by following the steps in this article: https://access.redhat.com/solutions/6578441 Workaround: For Log4j versions up to and including 2.15.0, this issue can be mitigated by removing the JndiLookup class from the classpath (example: zip -q -d log4j-core-*.jar org/apache/logging/log4j/core/lookup/JndiLookup.class).
🔗 References (7)
- selfhttps://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2021:5107
- externalhttps://access.redhat.com/security/updates/classification/#critical
- externalhttps://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/RHSB-2021-009
- externalhttps://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2030932
- externalhttps://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2031667
- externalhttps://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2032580
- selfhttps://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/advisories/2021/rhsa-2021_5107.json