Microsoft security update for CVE-2026-99561 — azl3 kernel 6.6.161.1-1 on Azure Linux 3.0
🔗 CVE IDs covered (1)
📋 Microsoft's advisory
EchelonGraph does not copy Microsoft's advisory page: its FAQ and remediation text are not shown here. Read the advisory on https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-99561. This page also shows what EchelonGraph holds for CVE-2026-99561, with the description from its CVE record, which the CVE Numbering Authority that assigned the CVE wrote: for a CVE Microsoft assigned, often in the words of Microsoft's own advisory.
🎯 Affected products1
- azl3 kernel 6.6.161.1-1 on Azure Linux 3.0
✅ Updates Microsoft lists: 1 update
1 row: one per KB article or update, update type and fixed build. Their details are on Microsoft's advisory.
| KB article | Update | Fixed build |
|---|---|---|
| — | Security Update | — |
🧭 EchelonGraph on CVE-2026-99561
- EchelonGraph score
- Not scored by EchelonGraph yet.
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Fix status
- A fix is available — apply it.
Description from the CVE record (CVE.org), as published by its numbering authority
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fork: don't create io threads once PF_POSTCOREDUMP is set zap_process() skips every thread that already has PF_POSTCOREDUMP set. Such a thread is past synchronize_group_exit(), so a coredump can't catch it anymore. It isn't counted in core_state->threads_remaining and it isn't sent SIGKILL. do_exit() sets PF_POSTCOREDUMP in synchronize_group_exit() and calls io_uring_files_cancel() right after that. The cancellation runs task work and a create_worker_cb() that io-wq queued before the exit creates a new io-wq worker from there. If another thread started a coredump in the meantime that worker joins a thread-group which is already being dumped. zap_process() never saw it so it was never counted. But when it exits it sees signal->core_state in synchronize_group_exit() and decrements threads_remaining like any other thread. So the count reaches zero one thread early and the dumper leaves coredump_wait_inactive() while a thread it counted is still running. The task has no fatal signal pending because zap_process() deliberately didn't send it one, and it never went through get_signal() so it doesn't have PF_SIGNALED either. Refuse to create an io thread when the creator has PF_POSTCOREDUMP. That costs nothing. io_uring_files_cancel() raises IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT before it runs any task work, so a worker created from there only ever gets to exit again, and io_should_retry_thread() doesn't retry -EINTR. Clearing PF_POSTCOREDUMP for the new thread in copy_process() was the other option. It makes the worker a thread like any other, but it only helps while the dump hasn't started. A worker born after zap_process() has run is invisible to it whatever its flags say and still decrements threads_remaining on the way out. Refusing to create it covers both, and then no task is ever born with the flag, so there is nothing to clear. Moving io_uring_files_cancel() ahead of synchronize_group_exit() closes the same window. It runs the cancellation, and whatever that can block on, before the thread announces itself to the dumper. A thread that blocks there never reaches coredump_task_exit() at all, so the dumper ends up waiting for a thread that never parks. Refusing the creation leaves the cancellation where it is. But it's very ugly to run io_uring work even before we did all the generic exit work.
Published by kernel.org, the CVE Numbering Authority that assigned CVE-2026-99561, in its CVE record at CVE.org; reused under the CVE Program's Terms of Use (its licence and MITRE's copyright notice are in our Terms of Service).