Microsoft security update for CVE-2026-99454 — azl3 kernel 6.6.161.1-1 on Azure Linux 3.0
🔗 CVE IDs covered (1)
📋 Microsoft's advisory
EchelonGraph does not copy Microsoft's advisory page: its FAQ and remediation text are not shown here. Read the advisory on https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-99454. This page also shows what EchelonGraph holds for CVE-2026-99454, with the description from its CVE record, which the CVE Numbering Authority that assigned the CVE wrote: for a CVE Microsoft assigned, often in the words of Microsoft's own advisory.
🎯 Affected products1
- azl3 kernel 6.6.161.1-1 on Azure Linux 3.0
✅ Updates Microsoft lists: 1 update
1 row: one per KB article or update, update type and fixed build. Their details are on Microsoft's advisory.
| KB article | Update | Fixed build |
|---|---|---|
| — | Security Update | — |
🧭 EchelonGraph on CVE-2026-99454
- EchelonGraph score
- 8.8 HIGH
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Fix status
- A fix is available — apply it.
Description from the CVE record (CVE.org), as published by its numbering authority
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix protected RX frame validation in decrypt path The RX software decrypt path mishandles crafted protected frames from a malicious AP in two ways: 1) decryptor() never checks that a protected frame is long enough to hold the 802.11 header plus the per-cipher trailer. All of rtw_wep_decrypt(), rtw_tkip_decrypt() and rtw_aes_decrypt() compute length = hdr.len - hdrlen - iv_len; and act on the result, and recvframe_chkmic() similarly computes datalen = hdr.len - hdrlen - iv_len - icv_len - 8; for TKIP (the 8-byte Michael MIC is not accounted for in icv_len). A frame shorter than hdrlen + iv_len + icv_len (+ 8 for TKIP) underflows these unsigned subtractions, turning into a ~4 GiB iteration count in aes_decipher()/arc4_crypt()/rtw_seccalctkipmic() or a ~4 GiB crc32_le() length, causing out-of-bounds reads/writes of up to ~4 GiB starting from the rx skb. Reject such frames in decryptor() before touching the IV; this covers all three ciphers and the TKIP MIC check, and also keeps the unconditional iv[3] access within the frame. 2) validate_80211w_mgmt() keeps using the frame - two memcpys through the stale rx_data pointer and a pkt_len update - before checking whether decryptor() returned NULL. On decrypt failure (e.g. a unicast protected deauth/disassoc/action frame with a bad MIC, which this path always software-decrypts) the skb has already been freed, so this is a use-after-free read/write, and the caller's error path frees the frame a second time, drifting free_recvframe_cnt. Bail out immediately when decryptor() fails, freeing the temporary mgmt_DATA buffer first. Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.
Published by kernel.org, the CVE Numbering Authority that assigned CVE-2026-99454, in its CVE record at CVE.org; reused under the CVE Program's Terms of Use (its licence and MITRE's copyright notice are in our Terms of Service).