OpenClaw: Sandbox `writeFile` commit could race outside the validated path
🔗 CVE IDs covered (1)
📋 Description
Summary
In affected versions of openclaw, the sandbox fs-bridge writeFile commit step used an unanchored container path during the final move into place. An attacker racing parent-path changes inside the sandbox could redirect the committed file outside the validated sandbox path.
Impact
This is a sandbox boundary bypass. In-sandbox code could win a time-of-check-time-of-use race and cause host-approved writeFile operations to land outside the validated writable path within the container mount namespace.
Affected Packages and Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected versions:
< 2026.3.11 - Fixed in:
2026.3.11
Technical Details
The hardening work for anchored remove, rename, and mkdir operations did not fully cover the writeFile commit path. The final mv still used the raw target path, leaving a race window between safety revalidation and the in-container commit step.
Fix
OpenClaw now anchors the writeFile commit path to the canonical parent directory before the final move. The fix shipped in [email protected].
Workarounds
Upgrade to 2026.3.11 or later.
🎯 Affected products1
- npm/openclaw:< 2026.3.11
🔗 References (5)
- https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-xvx8-77m6-gwg6
- https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.3.11
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32977
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-sandbox-boundary-bypass-via-unanchored-writefile-commit-path
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xvx8-77m6-gwg6