Coder: Route hijacking through lack of validation of agent-supplied AllowedIPs in tailnet coordinator
🔗 CVE IDs covered (1)
📋 Description
Summary
The tailnet coordinator validates that an agent's Addresses derive from its authenticated UUID but applies no equivalent check to AllowedIPs. The coordinator forwards agent-supplied AllowedIPs verbatim to tunnel peers which install them into the WireGuard peer configuration.
Impact
A malicious workspace agent can advertise arbitrary AllowedIPs prefixes including another agent's tailnet address. Coder's ServerTailnet routes to agents by tailnet IP so an agent that claims a victim's prefix can intercept web terminal and workspace app traffic and serve spoofed content. Exploitation requires an authenticated user with a running workspace and a modified agent binary.
Patches
The fix validates each AllowedIPs prefix against the authenticating agent's UUID just like Addresses.
The fix was backported to all supported release lines:
| Release line | Patched version | |---|---| | 2.34 | v2.34.2 | | 2.33 | v2.33.8 | | 2.32 | v2.32.7 | | 2.29 (ESR) | v2.29.17 |
Workarounds
Operators who cannot upgrade immediately should monitor coordinator logs for agents advertising unexpected AllowedIPs prefixes.
Resources
- Fix: #26144
Credits
Coder would like to thank Anthropic's Security Team (ANT-2026-22451) for independently disclosing this issue!
🎯 Affected products4
- go/github.com/coder/coder/v2:>= 2.34.0, < 2.34.2
- go/github.com/coder/coder/v2:>= 2.33.0, < 2.33.8
- go/github.com/coder/coder/v2:>= 2.30.0, < 2.32.7
- go/github.com/coder/coder/v2:< 2.29.17