NocoDB: Server-Side Request Forgery via Database Connection Host

Summary

The connection-test endpoint opened a raw TCP socket to the user-supplied database host without resolving and range-checking the destination, so private and link-local addresses (including IPv4-mapped IPv6 forms and localhost) reached the driver.

Details

A new validateDbConnectionHost helper resolves hostnames through DNS, parses each address with ipaddr.js, normalises IPv4-mapped IPv6, and rejects addresses in the private, loopback, link-local, unique-local, reserved, unspecified, broadcast, and carrier-grade-NAT ranges. 0.0.0.0, ::, and the literal localhost are special-cased. The check runs before the existing SSL block in the connection-test controller and gates the driver invocation.

Impact

Authenticated users with connection-test permission could probe internal services (Redis, the cloud metadata endpoint, internal databases) reachable from the NocoDB process. A DNS rebinding attacker could still race the resolve-vs-connect window.

Credit

This issue was reported by @helwor-01.