In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: bcm: fix data race on...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

can: bcm: fix data race on rx_stamp/rx_ifindex in bcm_rx_handler()

For an rx op subscribed on all interfaces (ifindex == 0), the same op is registered once in the shared per-netns wildcard filter list, so bcm_rx_handler() can run concurrently on different CPUs for frames arriving on different net devices.

op->rx_stamp and op->rx_ifindex were written before bcm_rx_update_lock was taken, allowing concurrent writers to race each other - including a torn store of the 64-bit rx_stamp on 32-bit platforms.

Beyond a torn store bcm_send_to_user() must report the timestamp/ifindex of the very same frame whose content it is delivering. So the assignment is placed in the same unbroken bcm_rx_update_lock section as the content comparison.

As a side effect, the RTR-request frame feature (which never reach bcm_send_to_user()) no longer updates rx_stamp/rx_ifindex, since only the notification path needs them.