XML::Sig versions from 0.29 before 0.72 for Perl allow signature verification bypass because...
🔗 CVE IDs covered (1)
📋 Description
XML::Sig versions from 0.29 before 0.72 for Perl allow signature verification bypass because verify returns true when every signature was skipped before any cryptographic check.
verify in lib/XML/Sig.pm counts the //dsig:Signature elements into $numsigs and iterates over them, but two paths reach next before any digest or key check runs: a SignedInfo/Reference/@URI that resolves to no element while $numsigs is greater than 1, and, when id_attr is set, a reference that does not match the requested ID. The loop records nothing about what it checked, so when every signature takes one of those paths control reaches the unconditional return 1 that ends verify. Two Signature elements whose Reference URI names an ID that no element carries is enough, as is one such element combined with id_attr.
Any caller that passes untrusted XML to verify can receive a true return for a document in which no digest and no signature value was checked; a cert or cert_text trust anchor does not change this, because no key check runs. Versions up to 0.28 use an XML::XPath based verify that has no such skip and are not affected.
🔗 References (5)
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-18568
- https://github.com/perl-net-saml2/perl-XML-Sig/commit/ef22cfed1ac0f29b316d17eb79cf6480e03ae16a.patch
- https://metacpan.org/release/TIMLEGGE/XML-Sig-0.72/changes
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-40934
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r3hj-rg3j-262c