The pattern '/\domain.com' is not disallowed when redirecting, allowing for open redirect

Impact

An open redirect vulnerability has been found in oauth2_proxy. Anyone who uses oauth2_proxy may potentially be impacted.

For a context [detectify] have an in depth blog post about the potential impact of an open redirect. Particularly see the OAuth section.

tl;dr: People's authentication tokens could be silently harvested by an attacker. e.g: facebook.com/oauth.php?clientid=123&state=abc&redirect_url=https://yourdomain.com/red.php?url%3dhttps://attacker.com/

Patches

@sauyon found the issue, and has submitted a patch.

diff --git a/oauthproxy.go b/oauthproxy.go
index 72ab580..f420df6 100644
--- a/oauthproxy.go
+++ b/oauthproxy.go
@@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ func (p *OAuthProxy) GetRedirect(req *http.Request) (redirect string, err error)
 // IsValidRedirect checks whether the redirect URL is whitelisted
 func (p *OAuthProxy) IsValidRedirect(redirect string) bool {
 	switch {
-	case strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "/") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "//"):
+	case strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "/") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "//") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "/\\"):
 		return true
 	case strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "http://") || strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "https://"):
 		redirectURL, err := url.Parse(redirect)

This patch will be applied to the next release, which is scheduled for when this is publicly disclosed.

Workarounds

At this stage there is no work around.