Multiple @opentelemetry/instrumentation-* packages expose database username via unconditional db.user span attribute
🔗 CVE IDs covered (1)
📋 Description
Impact
Multiple @opentelemetry/instrumentation-* packages recorded the database connection username as the db.user
span attribute on every instrumented database operation. This attribute was emitted unconditionally — it was
not gated by enhancedDatabaseReporting or any other opt-in flag, and it was the default behaviour for
all users of the affected packages until the patched releases shipped on 2026-07-23.
The attribute is forwarded to every configured observability backend (Jaeger, Zipkin, Datadog, OTLP collectors, etc.). Depending on the database account naming convention in use, the exported value may reveal:
- Internal service account names that disclose architecture topology.
- Role-encoded usernames (e.g.
admin_readwrite,app_readonly_prod) useful for privilege inference. - Database account naming patterns useful for credential enumeration.
Affected packages (all are vulnerable from the first published version through the version listed below):
| Package | Vulnerable range | Patched version |
|---------|-----------------|-----------------|
| @opentelemetry/instrumentation-cassandra-driver | < 0.66.0 | 0.66.0 |
| @opentelemetry/instrumentation-knex | < 0.65.0 | 0.65.0 |
| @opentelemetry/instrumentation-mongoose | < 0.67.0 | 0.67.0 |
| @opentelemetry/instrumentation-mysql | < 0.67.0 | 0.67.0 |
| @opentelemetry/instrumentation-mysql2 | < 0.67.0 | 0.67.0 |
| @opentelemetry/instrumentation-oracledb | < 0.46.0 | 0.46.0 |
| @opentelemetry/instrumentation-pg | < 0.73.0 | 0.73.0 |
| @opentelemetry/instrumentation-tedious | < 0.40.0 | 0.40.0 |
Patches
Fixed in the coordinated release on 2026-07-23 via feat!: only emit stable http, network and database attributes (#3585).
Upgrade to the patched version listed in the table above for each instrumentation package in use.
Workarounds
No configuration-level workaround exists in the affected versions: the db.user attribute cannot be
suppressed without patching. As a partial mitigation, a custom SpanProcessor can be used to strip db.user from spans before they leave the process:
// Example: drop db.user in a custom SpanProcessor
class StripDbUserProcessor implements SpanProcessor {
onStart(span: Span) {
span.setAttribute('db.user', null);
}
onEnd() {}
shutdown() { return Promise.resolve(); }
forceFlush() { return Promise.resolve(); }
}
Users who control the downstream collector can also filter the attribute at the collector pipeline level.
🎯 Affected products8
- npm/@opentelemetry/instrumentation-cassandra-driver:< 0.66.0
- npm/@opentelemetry/instrumentation-tedious:< 0.40.0
- npm/@opentelemetry/instrumentation-oracledb:< 0.46.0
- npm/@opentelemetry/instrumentation-mongoose:< 0.67.0
- npm/@opentelemetry/instrumentation-mysql:< 0.67.0
- npm/@opentelemetry/instrumentation-knex:< 0.65.0
- npm/@opentelemetry/instrumentation-mysql2:< 0.67.0
- npm/@opentelemetry/instrumentation-pg:< 0.73.0
🔗 References (6)
- https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-js-contrib/security/advisories/GHSA-qqmp-wf37-98f9
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104872
- https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-js-contrib/pull/3585
- https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-js-contrib/commit/27e172a9e0d549559056ccd58f27d13467454156
- https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-js-contrib/commit/5b7dd0e102e940d653e04b08b5a1b721a8271037
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qqmp-wf37-98f9