OpenClaw's image tool bypasses tools.fs.workspaceOnly on sandbox mount paths and exfiltrates out-of-workspace images
🔗 CVE IDs covered (1)
📋 Description
Summary
In OpenClaw, the sandboxed image tool did not honor tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true for mounted paths resolved by the sandbox FS bridge. This allowed reading out-of-workspace mounted images (for example /agent/*) and forwarding those bytes to vision model providers.
Impact
Sandbox boundary bypass with confidentiality impact. In affected versions, read/write/edit respected workspace-only guardrails, but image could still load mounted out-of-workspace files and exfiltrate them via model requests.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected versions:
<= 2026.2.22-2 - Patched versions:
>= 2026.2.23(released) - Latest published npm at triage time:
2026.2.22-2
Technical Details
workspaceOnly was enforced in sandbox file tools and apply_patch, but not propagated/enforced for image sandbox path resolution. The fix threads workspaceOnly into image-tool construction and asserts sandbox-root containment before loading media bytes.
Fix Commit(s)
dd9d9c1c609dcb4579f9e57bd7b5c879d0146b53
OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
🎯 Affected products1
- npm/openclaw:< 2026.2.23
🔗 References (5)
- https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-q6qf-4p5j-r25g
- https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/dd9d9c1c609dcb4579f9e57bd7b5c879d0146b53
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32002
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-sandbox-boundary-bypass-via-image-tool-workspaceonly-bypass
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q6qf-4p5j-r25g