Tornado: Open redirect in RedirectHandler via protocol-relative URLs
🔗 CVE IDs covered (1)
📋 Description
Summary
tornado.web.RedirectHandler builds its target URL by substituting parts of the request path into a template. Depending on where those substitutions appear in the template, an attacker can craft a request that redirects to a host of their choosing. This creates an open redirect on the application's domain, which can be used in phishing.
Impact
Applications are affected if they use RedirectHandler with a URL template where a regex capture group can influence the scheme or host of the redirect. This includes:
- A substitution at the start of the path, for example
(r"/(.*)/target", RedirectHandler, {"url": "/{0}/destination"}). A request tohttps://example.com//evil.com/targetredirects to//evil.com/destination, a protocol-relative URL pointing to evil.com. Variants using backslashes or encoded characters have the same effect, because browsers treat them as equivalent to//. - A substitution directly after the host, for example
(r"/old(.*)", RedirectHandler, {"url": "https://new.example.com{0}"}). A request to/old.evil.com/or/[email protected]/redirects to evil.com. - A template that begins with a substitution (such as
"{0}"), which can be given an absolute URL.
Applications are not affected if their RedirectHandler templates use only static URLs, or if every substitution comes after a fixed host and a / (for example "/static/{0}" or "https://example.com/{0}"). Other uses of RequestHandler.redirect() are not affected by this advisory, although applications that pass user-controlled input to redirect() should validate it themselves.
Patches
Fixed in Tornado 6.6. RedirectHandler now returns a 400 error if the substituted values would change the scheme or host of the redirect from what the template specifies. As a result, substitutions can no longer be used in the scheme or host part of a template. The similar check in StaticFileHandler has also been hardened against backslash and whitespace variants.
Workarounds
- Change
RedirectHandlertemplates so every substitution comes after a fixed prefix ending in/, or write capture-group regexes that cannot match characters such as/,\,@,.or:where they could affect the host. - Alternatively, replace
RedirectHandlerwith a custom handler that validates the target before callingself.redirect().
Credit
Reported by Longwei Wang (@gn00295120).
🎯 Affected products1
- pip/tornado:< 6.6
🔗 References (8)
- https://github.com/tornadoweb/tornado/security/advisories/GHSA-pw9p-v7r6-gx4p
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-116578
- https://github.com/tornadoweb/tornado/pull/3786
- https://github.com/tornadoweb/tornado/commit/940ea725bdd9bc68231d68a105eef17ea6e11233
- https://github.com/tornadoweb/tornado/commit/cc75ab0eb3af459c714895a49f682ad354f50117
- https://github.com/tornadoweb/tornado/commit/ccb6a2e5482f17997efd4a74b8200d5b4babc035
- https://github.com/tornadoweb/tornado/releases/tag/v6.6.0
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pw9p-v7r6-gx4p