In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ovl: always encode the...
🔗 CVE IDs covered (1)
📋 Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovl: always encode the origin fh when index is enabled
On an overlay with index=on,nfs_export=on, copy up of a directory crashes the kernel once an LSM has started to deny CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH to the mounter, the task that mounted the overlay. The mount and the LSM policy change require root. After that, any user who can write to a directory that exists only in a lower layer triggers the oops by doing so.
Before a file or directory that exists only in a lower layer is changed for the first time, overlayfs copies it to the writable upper layer. This is called copy up.
On copy up, ovl_get_origin_fh() encodes the file handle of the lower inode, called the origin. It returns NULL if ovl_can_decode_fh() says that the lower filesystem cannot decode handles. Whether the callers can handle NULL depends on the index option:
- Without an index, NULL is fine: the callers store an empty origin xattr.
- With index enabled, overlayfs keeps entries for copied up inodes in an internal index directory. The name of an index entry is derived from the handle, so ovl_get_origin_fh() must return a handle or an error.
The mount only enables the index if ovl_can_decode_fh() succeeds for all layers, but the result can change later. The function checks the export operations of the filesystem and capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH). Copy up runs with the mounter's credentials, and an LSM can start to deny the capability to those credentials after the mount. ovl_get_origin_fh() then returns NULL with index enabled.
This goes wrong in two callers:
- With nfs_export=on, copy up of a directory creates an index entry for the directory. ovl_create_index() passes the NULL handle to ovl_get_index_name_fh(), which dereferences it.
- If the result changes while mount(2) is still running, ovl_get_indexdir() passes a NULL from ovl_get_origin_fh() to ovl_verify_set_fh() in the same way.
Before the commit in the Fixes tag, these two callers encoded the handle themselves, without consulting ovl_can_decode_fh().
Reproduced with a BPF LSM program that started to deny the capability after the mount. An unprivileged touch in a directory that had not been copied up yet oopsed in ovl_get_index_name_fh(). With this patch the touch succeeds and the directory gets its index entry.
Fix this by calling ovl_can_decode_fh() in ovl_get_origin_fh() only when index is disabled.
🔗 References (7)
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99421
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1795ca6571199008f67afa9e88cddf199ddde9ca
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4a58c0d62bd23173dee3f337f623d3e14b6c9dd4
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5ccb1e71dfea95a9789967c34d68a2b7c048303e
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/949f9d8a5580c77a45fa759123367682aba4d173
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b050952bc4e3409c655a4abcd987131bd77ef570
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mrg7-v4wg-hf5p