CodeIgniter: Path traversal in UploadedFile::move() when using client-provided filenames
🔗 CVE IDs covered (1)
📋 Description
Impact
In affected versions, calling UploadedFile::move() without a second argument uses the client-provided filename without sanitization. Depending on the destination path and server configuration, an attacker can supply a filename containing path traversal sequences (e.g. ../../public/shell.php) to write uploaded content outside the intended upload directory.
The patch sanitizes this default (no-argument) path.
Note: The patch only sanitizes the filename when no second argument is passed. If your application explicitly passes a client-provided name as the second argument, you remain responsible for sanitizing it - the patch does not (and cannot) sanitize a caller-supplied filename:
// Unsafe - even after upgrading:
$file->move(WRITEPATH . 'uploads', $file->getName());
$file->move(WRITEPATH . 'uploads', $file->getClientName());
Patches
Upgrade to v4.7.4 or later.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade immediately, use a generated filename or sanitize the client filename before passing it to move().
Use a generated filename:
$file->move(WRITEPATH . 'uploads', $file->getRandomName());
Or sanitize the client filename before passing it to move():
helper('security');
$name = sanitize_filename($file->getClientName());
$file->move(WRITEPATH . 'uploads', $name);
🎯 Affected products1
- composer/codeigniter4/framework:< 4.7.4
🔗 References (5)
- https://github.com/codeigniter4/CodeIgniter4/security/advisories/GHSA-hhmc-q9hp-r662
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63222
- https://github.com/codeigniter4/CodeIgniter4/commit/20ebcf4694d96d3c97fbc3938e360730e4f54618
- https://github.com/codeigniter4/CodeIgniter4/releases/tag/v4.7.4
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hhmc-q9hp-r662