install -D: symlink race in directory creation allows arbitrary file overwrite

The -D path runs fs::create_dir_all on a pathname then later opens the destination via path-based File::create/fs::copy, neither anchored to a directory fd. Between the two, an attacker can replace a path component with a symlink, redirecting the write.

Impact: an attacker with concurrent write access to the destination tree can redirect a privileged install -D to an arbitrary location, enabling arbitrary file overwrite with attacker-controlled content. Recommendation: use dirfd-based traversal (openat/mkdirat + O_NOFOLLOW) per component and create the destination via openat on the same dirfd.

Remediation: Acknowledged by Canonical; fixed in commit 0c412999.

Reported by Zellic in the uutils coreutils Program Security Assessment (prepared for Canonical, Jan 20 2026), audited commit 3a07ffc5a9bd4c283e75afa548ba1f1957bad242. Finding 3.51. Credit: Zellic.