In `github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11/v2` versions `<= 2.0.0-rc8` (and the deprecated v1 module...
🔗 CVE IDs covered (1)
📋 Description
In github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11/v2 versions <= 2.0.0-rc8 (and the deprecated v1 module paths github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11 <= 1.6.8, github.com/ThalesGroup/crypto11 <= 1.7.0-rc1 and github.com/ThalesIgnite/crypto11 <= 1.2.5), the cipher.AEAD returned by SecretKey.NewGCM() passes whatever nonce it is given straight to CK_GCM_PARAMS without checking its length against NonceSize(), and accepts an empty nonce. On a token that accepts a zero-length GCM IV — SoftHSM2 does — every Seal with an empty nonce encrypts under the same IV, reusing the keystream and exposing the GHASH authentication key, which allows forgeries. Separately, Config.UseGCMIVFromHSM sends a NULL IV with length zero to the token unless GCMIVFromHSMControl.SupplyIvForHSMGCMEncrypt is also set, so the token has nowhere to write the IV it generates: a Seal with a non-empty nonce panics after the plaintext has already been encrypted, and a Seal with an empty nonce returns ciphertext under an empty IV without error. On the v1 line HSM-IV mode additionally never copies the token-generated IV back to the caller, so the caller keeps its own nonce while the data was encrypted under another one.
🔗 References (5)
- https://github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11/security/advisories/GHSA-c2cp-4qw8-q4jg
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-115407
- https://github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11/commit/8d99b73c721c173ad85c0ca4e063c3da360a611d
- https://gitlab.eclipse.org/security/cve-assignment/-/work_items/491
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9q64-h4f4-jp28