In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: bound...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

f2fs: bound i_inline_xattr_size for non-inline-xattr inodes

When the flexible_inline_xattr feature is enabled, do_read_inode() loads the on-disk i_inline_xattr_size unconditionally:

if (f2fs_sb_has_flexible_inline_xattr(sbi))
	fi->i_inline_xattr_size = le16_to_cpu(ri->i_inline_xattr_size);

but sanity_check_inode() only range-checks it when the inode also has the FI_INLINE_XATTR flag set. An inode that carries an inline dentry or inline data but not FI_INLINE_XATTR -- the normal layout for an inline directory -- therefore keeps a fully attacker-controlled i_inline_xattr_size from a crafted image.

get_inline_xattr_addrs() returns that value with no flag gating, so it feeds the inode geometry:

MAX_INLINE_DATA()  = 4 * (CUR_ADDRS_PER_INODE - i_inline_xattr_size - 1)
NR_INLINE_DENTRY() = MAX_INLINE_DATA() * BITS_PER_BYTE / (...)
addrs_per_page()   = CUR_ADDRS_PER_INODE - i_inline_xattr_size

A large i_inline_xattr_size drives MAX_INLINE_DATA() and NR_INLINE_DENTRY() negative, so make_dentry_ptr_inline() sets d->max (int) to a negative value. The inline directory walk then compares an unsigned long bit_pos against that negative d->max, which is promoted to a huge unsigned bound, and reads far past the inline area:

while (bit_pos < d->max)		/* fs/f2fs/dir.c */
	... test_bit_le(bit_pos, d->bitmap) / d->dentry[bit_pos] ...

Mounting a crafted image and reading such a directory triggers an out-of-bounds read in f2fs_fill_dentries(); the same underflow also corrupts ADDRS_PER_INODE for regular files.

Validate i_inline_xattr_size against MAX_INLINE_XATTR_SIZE whenever the flexible_inline_xattr feature is enabled -- i.e. whenever the value is loaded from disk and consumed -- and keep the lower MIN_INLINE_XATTR_SIZE bound gated on inodes that actually carry an inline xattr, so legitimate inodes with i_inline_xattr_size == 0 are still accepted.