Coder's OIDC email_verified type coercion bypass enables account takeover via unverified email linking

Summary

Coder's OIDC callback checked email_verified with a direct Go bool type assertion. When an IdP returned the claim as a non-boolean (for example the string "false") or omitted it, the assertion failed open and the email was treated as verified. Combined with an unconditional email-based account fallback, this enabled account takeover.

Impact

An attacker who registered a victim's email at a compatible IdP without verifying it could log in via OIDC and be matched to the victim's existing Coder account, receiving a session for that account. No prior authentication to Coder was required and the result was full account takeover.

Patches

The fix coerces email_verified across bool, string and numeric types (fail-closed) and blocks the email fallback when the matched user already has a different linked IdP subject.

The fix was backported to all supported release lines:

| Release line | Patched version | |---|---| | 2.34 | v2.34.2 | | 2.33 | v2.33.8 | | 2.32 | v2.32.7 | | 2.29 (ESR) | v2.29.17 |

Workarounds

Ensure the IdP returns email_verified as a native JSON boolean. The email-fallback linking issue has no configuration workaround; upgrading is required.

Resources

• Fix: #25712, #25713

Credits

Coder would like to thank Anthropic's Security Team (ANT-2026-22444) for independently disclosing this issue!